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I. INTRODUCTION
In Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health,1 the
Supreme Court held that states can constitutionally prohibit the
withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment from patients
who fail to provide clear and convincing evidence of their express
wishes.2 The Court did not, however, explicitly recognize a constitu-
tional right to die. 3 Despite the Court's narrow holding and its lack
of guidance for future decisions,4 Cruzan does make one important
contribution: because it emphasizes the importance of patient
intention,' it has led to a renewed interest in advanced directives,
including living wills and durable powers of attorney.6  Estate
S110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990).
2 The Court's statement of its holding is even narrower: "In sum, we conclude
that a state may apply a clear and convincing evidence standard in proceedings
where a guardian seeks to discontinue nutrition and hydration of a person diagnosed
to be in a persistent vegetative state." Id. at 2854.
3 The Court recognized a constitutional right to refuse treatment. Id. at 2851.
As Justice Scalia carefully pointed out, however, the Court did not explicitly hold that
there is a constitutional right to refuse life-sustaining treatment. He concluded "that
the Constitution has nothing to say about the subject" of life-sustaining treatment.
Id. at 2863 (Scalia, J., concurring).
4 The Cruzan decision leaves unanswered the following questions, among others:
Under which circumstances may a state totally prohibit the withholding or
withdrawing of life-sustaining treatment? May artificial nutrition and hydration be
treated differently than other forms of medical care? Are the decisions of a person
whom the patient has selected, such as an agent under a durable power of attorney,
constitutionally protected?
5 If anything is clear about Cruzan, it is that the state is not constitutionally
required to honor the family's best guess as to the patient's intentions. See id. at
2855 ("But we do not think that the Due Process Clause requires the state to repose
judgment on these matters with anyone but the patient herself.").
6 See, e.g., N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 1990, at A19 (containing a guide to preparing
a living will); Ellen Goodman, Headed for Missouri? Don't Leave Hone Without a
Living Will, ARGUS LEADER, June 30, 1990, at 8A (recommending living wills and
durable powers of attorney in response to Cruzan); Diane Katz, Interest in "Living
Wills" Soar, ARGUS LEADER, July 1, 1990, at 3A (reporting that the Society for the
Right to Die added six workers to handle the deluge of post-Cnuzan inquiries);
Making Sure Your Wishes are Honored, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., July 9, 1990, at
24 (advocating the execution of both a living will and a durable power of attorney
with health care provisions); NAT'L L.J., July 9, 1990, at 24 (Professor Meisel of the
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planners must now gear up to respond.
Gearing up will require knowledge of pertinent state legislation,
much of which has been enacted within the past few years. Since
1988, living will statutes have been enacted in seven jurisdictions,
thereby raising to forty-six the number of jurisdictions with living will
or natural death acts. 7 More significantly, since 1988, more than
thirty jurisdictions have enacted statutes authorizing durable powers
of attorney for health care, bringing the total number of jurisdictions
with such legislation to forty-one.8
University of Pittsburgh, in commenting on Cnzan, states that "I think the practical
message to doctors will be: We have to be a lot more careful and circumspect and
shouldn't remove life support without a living will.").
Further interest will be generated by the requirement, effective December 1,
1991, that patients receive written information regarding advance directives upon
admission to a Medicare- or Medicaid-reimbursed hospital, skilled nursing facility,
home health agency, hospice program, or prepaid organization. See Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, § 4206, 104 Stat. 1388, 1388-115 to
-117 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.); id. § 4751, 104 Stat. at 1388-204 to
-206 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
7 Kentucky Living Will Act, ch. 122, 1990 Ky. Acts 332 (codified at KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 311.622-.644 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1990)); Adult Health Care
Decisions Act, ch. 3, 1989 Minn. Laws 8 (codified at MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 145B.01-
.17 (West Supp. 1991)); New Jersey Advance Directives for Health Care Act, ch.
201, 1991 NJ. Sess. Law Serv. 800 (West) (codified at N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 26:2H-53
to -78 (West Supp. 1992)); Act approved Apr. 10, 1989, ch. 309, 1989 N.D. Laws 858
(codified as amended at N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 23-06.4-01 to -14 (Supp. 1991));
Modified Uniform Rights of the Terminally III Act, Am. Substitute S.B.1, 1991 Ohio
Legis. Serv. 159, 166-76 (Anderson) (codified at OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2133.01-
.15 (Anderson Supp. 1991)); Rights of the Terminally III Act, chs. 166 & 308, 1992
R.I. Pub. Laws ___ - (codified at R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 23-4.11-1 to -13 (Supp.
1991)); Act approved Mar. 14, 1991, ch. 273, 1991 S.D. Laws 440 (codified at S.D.
CODIFIED LAW ANN. §§ 34-12D-1 to -22 (Supp. 1992)). A complete list of the other
living will statutes can be found in ALAN MEISEL, THE RIGHT TO DIE 359 (1989).
As of December 31, 1991, living will statutes or, as they are sometimes termed,
natural death acts, had yet to be enacted in Massachusetts, Michigan, Nebraska, New
York, and Pennsylvania.
8 For a list of the statutes and their types, see infra notes 118-30 and
accompanying text. This list is current as of December 31, 1991. The number will
probably be higher by the time this article is published.
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Durable power of attorney for health care statutes were not
enacted in a vacuum, but rather reflect the fundamental changes that
are occurring in all aspects of durable powers. What began little
more than twenty years ago as a simple concept has recently become
quite complex. Statutory forms have proliferated,9 and the general
durable power statutes are giving way to special purpose statutes,
most notably health care and financial accounts statutes.10
The new complexity is not without purpose. Changes have been
made to overcome third party reluctance to honor powers and to
make durable powers widely available to the general public. Yet,
those positive steps are not without costs. Uniformity, an important
goal for both property and health powers, is now only a mirage. A
client who moves to another state may no longer assume that the
power executed in the previous home state will be valid and effective
in the new home state."1 Furthermore, because statutes have
become so complex, counsel must carefully advise a client as to the
form's proper execution and preparation. This assumes, of course,
that the principal will seek legal advice, which is less likely today than
formerly because of the proliferation of do-it-yourself forms.
This article examines the current legislative landscape in durable
powers. It begins with general durable powers, focusing on the
states' reception of the durable power provisions of the Uniform
Probate Code (UPC). Examined next are the new durable powers,
which include the statutory short-form, the durable power bank
account, and, most importantly, the durable power for health care.
With the exception of the health care powers, emphasis is placed on
1988, 1989, and 1990 developments. For the health care powers, this
article includes a discussion of legislation enacted through 1991.
9 For a discussion of the statutory short-forms directed primarily at property
management, see infra text accompanying notes 51-79. For a discussion of the
statutory form health care powers, see infia text accompanying notes 124-266.
10 For a discussion of what is here termed the "durable power bank account,"
see infra text accompanying notes 80-111.
1 For a discussion of this problem as it relates to the statutory health care
forms, see infra notes 255-66 and accompanying text.
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II. THE UPC AND ITS INFLUENCE
At common law a power of attorney was revoked by the
principal's incapacity.12  That common-law rule has now been
abrogated by statute in all fifty states and the District of Columbia. t3
If the instrument so authorizes, the authority of the agent14 may
now survive the principal's incapacity.' 5  This abrupt shift to a
durable power concept is due to the wide acceptance of the durable
power provisions of the UPC. First proposed in 1969, the durable
power provisions of the UPC, or its identical twin, the Uniform
Durable Power of Attorney Act (UDPAA), are now in effect in
twenty-five states and the District of Columbia.16 These two acts
have also served as models for the enactments in many of the other
states.17
The UPC and UDPAA offer the principal several options. A
principal may create a nondurable power, which terminates upon
receipt of actual knowledge of the principal's death or incapacity. A
principal may create a standard durable power, which survives
12 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 122 (1957).
13 For a list of what are termed general durable power of attorney statutes, see
Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2858 n.3 (1990)
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
14 For ease of expression, "agent" is used throughout instead of the more
cumbersome "attorney in fact."
15 The general durable power statutes also eliminated the civil law variant in
effect in some states that the power survived incapacity only for the purpose of
protecting the agent and others until they were in possession of actual knowledge of
incapacity. See William F. Fratcher, Persons Under Disability, in UNIFORM PROBATE
CODE PRACTICE MANUAL § 14.37, at 249 (Robert Wright ed., 1972).
16 The 26 jurisdictions that have adopted the UPC, including its durable power
provisions, or that have instead adopted the UDPAA, are listed in UNIF. DURABLE
POWER OF ATTORNEY ACT, 8A U.L.A. 96 (Supp. 1992).
17 The Joint Editorial Board of the Uniform Probate Code concluded in 1983
that more than 30 states had enacted UPC-inspired durable power statutes. UNIF.
PROBATE CODE §§ 5-501 to -505 prefatory note, 8 U.L.A. 512 (1983). One
commentator, however, has listed 42 states with statutes modeled after or containing
language echoing the UPC. Mark Fowler, Note, Appointing an Agent to Make
Medical Treatment Choices, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 985, 1012 n.175 (1984).
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incapacity and terminates upon receipt of actual knowledge of the
principal's death. Or a principal may create a springing power,
under which the authority of the agent springs into effect upon
incapacity and, like the standard power, terminates upon actual
knowledge of the principal's death.18
As originally enacted, the UPC durable power provisions failed
to anticipate a number of potential problems. The 1969 UPC did not
explicitly provide that a principal could nominate a guardian or
conservator, a common and sound estate planning practice. 9 This
defect was remedied in 1979.2 However, the statute, both as
originally approved and as later amended, did not address another
18 See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 5-501, 8 U.L.A. 272 (Supp. 1991); id. § 5-504, 8
U.L.A. 516 (1983). Citations to the identical UDPAA have generally been omitted
throughout. This section of the article focuses on legislative change and not on a
detailed description of the UPC nor on the many planning questions that may arise
in connection with general durable powers. For such a discussion, see John J.
Lombard, Jr., Asset Management Under a Durable Power of Attorney-- The Ideal
Solution to Guardianships and Conservatorships, 9 PROB. NOTES 189 (1983); John J.
Lombard, Jr., Planning for Disability: Durable Powers, Standby Tnists and Preserving
Eligibility for Governmental Benefits, 20 INST. ON EST. PLAN. 1700, 1701-1709
(1986).
19 The most widely applicable reasons for nominating the agent as guardian or
conservator are to discourage others from applying for appointment and to assure
the continued authority of the agent should an appointment become necessary. See,
e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 5-503 cmt., 8 U.L.A. 515 (1983). Also, in a number of
jurisdictions, a nomination in a power may secure the waiver of the guardian's or
conservator's bond. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-645(c) (West Supp.
1992); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 30-27-25 (1984). In addition, in Ohio a
nomination in a power may override a restriction against nonresidents acting as
guardians. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2109.21(C) (Anderson Supp. 1991).
20 UPC § 5-503(b) authorizes a principal to nominate a guardian or conservator
and requires the court to make the appointment in accordance with the most recent
nomination unless the nominee is disqualified or good cause is shown. UNIF.
PROBATE CODE § 5-503(b), 8 U.L.A. 514-15 (1983). Other 1979 changes included
amendments relating to the protection of third parties, amendments relating to the
protection of an agent for actions taken without actual knowledge of the principal's
death, a reorganization that expanded the number of sections from two to five, and
the addition of the UDPAA as a free-standing act. See UNIF. DURABLE POWER OF
ATTORNEY AcT prefatory note, 8A U.L.A. 275-77 (1983); UNIF. PROBATE CODE
§ 5-501 prefatory note, 8 U.L.A. 511-13 (1983).
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possible defect: the contention that a power becomes invalid due to
lapse of time.2' That hole was plugged in 1984, and then again in
1987, by amendments providing that the power remains exercisable
despite the lapse of time since its execution.2 Given the ingrained
hostility to durable powers among many third parties, however, one
may question whether the lapse of time amendments will be
effective.23 Furthermore, even if they are effective, the UPC still
does not address a host of other justifications offered for the refusal
to accept a power, including doubts as to the validity of the power's
creation, the propriety of an agent's action, the scope of an agent's
authority, and the timeliness of an agent's authority under a springing
power. 24
21 The lapse of time or "staleness" problem may be traceable to the common-
law tenet that the authority of an agent under an agency which does not specify a
termination date expires after a reasonable time. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY § 105 (1957). In responding to the staleness problem, many banks,
insurance companies, title companies, mutual funds firms, and brokerage firms
established arbitrary cut-offs, such as six months or one year from execution, after
which they would not accept a durable power. See, e.g., Robert Whitman & Linda
M. Terry, How Do Insurance Companies Regard the Durable Power of Attorney?, TR.
& EST., June 1979, at 50; Durable Power of Attorney, PROB. & PROP., Fall 1983, at
31. There appears to have been little improvement in recent years. See, e.g., James
N. Zartman, Planning for Disability, 15 PROB. NOTES 11, 17 n.17 (1989) (one major
brokerage firm refuses to accept powers; another has "national policy" that it will
accept only powers no more than five years old).
22 UPC § 5-501, the definition of durable power of attorney, was amended in
1984 to provide that lapse of time does not affect the exercise of an agent's authority
unless the power states a time of termination. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 5-501, 8
U.L.A. 272 (Supp. 1991). UPC § 5-502, a provision relating to the effectiveness of
the agent's authority, was amended in 1987 to add a similar provision. Id. § 5-502,
8 U.L.A. 273.
23 James Zartman has suggested that third parties frequently reject durable
powers due to ignorance of the fact that the law has been changed to permit a
power to survive incapacity. See Zartman, supra note 21, at 17 (stating that "[w]ith
the advent of durable powers, this concern of third parties should have been laid to
rest. But old, thoroughly-ingrained habits die hard. And rules of thumb about
powers of attorney that have become 'standard operating procedure' in large
organizations are hard to change." (footnote omitted)).
24 UPC § 5-505 authorizes third parties to seek protection by requesting that the
agent provide an affidavit that the power has not been revoked or terminated due to
death or, in the case of a nondurable power, terminated due to incapacity. UNIF.
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In addition, recent UPC amendments have not contributed to
the goal that gave the UPC its name: the enactment of uniform
legislation. There are today four different uniform acts in effect
among the twenty-six jurisdictions that have officially adopted the
UDPAA or the UPC, including its durable power provisions: the
1969, 1979, 1984, and 1987 versions.2 These versions are in
addition to the many variations in particular states that are not based
on the official text, including provisions covering such matters as
consent for health care, the inclusion of an optional statutory form,
a requirement that the power be executed in the same manner as a
will, and procedures for court oversight of agents' actions. 26
Since 1988, the influence of the UPC has continued. Oklahoma
joined the official list of adopting jurisdictions in 1988,27 and Hawaii
PROBATE CODE § 5-505, 8 U.L.A. 517-18 (1983). No protective procedure is
provided, however, for third parties who have the concerns listed in the text.
25 The official list, with citations, is located in UNIF. DURABLE POWER OF
ATTORNEY ACT, 8A U.L.A. 96 (Supp. 1992). Of the 26 jurisdictions listed, the
statutes of Minnesota, Missouri, and South Carolina vary so greatly from the official
text that no attempt at classification was made. Of the remaining 23 jurisdictions,
the 1969 version is currently in force in seven: Arizona, Colorado, Kentucky, Maine,
Michigan, New Mexico, and Utah; the 1979 version is currently in force in 11;
Alabama, California, Delaware, Hawaii, Idaho, Kansas, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania,
Tennessee, West Virginia, and Wisconsin; the 1984 version is currently in force in
three: the District of Columbia, Nebraska, and Oklahoma; and Montana and North
Dakota have adopted the 1987 version.
26 See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-14-501(1) (West Supp. 1991) (health
care consent); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 5-501 (West Supp. 1991) (health
care consent); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 523.23 (West 1990) (optional statutory form);
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 404.727 (Vernon 1990) (court oversight); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 45-
5-501 (Michie 1989) (optional statutory form); S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-5-501 (Law. Co-
op. Supp. 1991) (will execution formalities, recording, and health care consent).
27 Act approved July 1, 1988, ch. 293, §§ 1-7, 1988 Okla. Sess. Laws 1453, 1453-
54 (codified at OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 58, §§ 1071-1077 (West Supp. 1992)). Powers
executed prior to November 1, 1988 continue to be governed by the previous statute,
which was based on the Model Special Power of Attorney for Small Property
Interests Act, a precursor of the UPC that was not widely enacted. Oklahoma's
version of the Model Act is codified at OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 58, §§ 1051-1063 (West
Supp. 1992). For a discussion of the Model Act, see Fowler, supra note 17, at 1016-
22.
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made the list in 1989.28 Among the nonadopting states, Texas29
and Virginia 3° added the lapse of time concept, New York and Ohio
gave statutory recognition to the springing power, 31 and Florida
removed its bar against nonrelative agents. 32
28 Act effective June 8,1989, Act 270, 1989 Haw. Sess. Laws 594 (codified at
HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 551D-1 to -7 (Supp. 1991)). Former § 560:5-501 of the Hawaii
Revised Statutes was identical to § 5-501 of the UPC as originally approved in 1969,
but former § 560:5-502, unlike UPC § 5-502 as originally approved, did not delay the
termination of the power until the agent or third party possessed actual knowledge
of the terminating event. Compare UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 5-501 to -502 (1969),
reprinted in 2 UNIFORM PROBATE CODE PRACTICE MANUAL 493, 493-95 (2d ed.
1977) (requiring actual knowledge by the agent for termination) with HAW. REV.
STAT. 560:5-501 to -502 (1988) (repealed 1989) (power of attorney terminates at
disability or death of principal).
29 Act effective Aug. 28, 1989, ch. 404, § 1, 1989 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 1550,
1550-51 (Vernon) (amending TEx. PROB. CODE ANN. § 36A (West Supp. 1992)).
Chapter 404 also amends § 36A to require that a durable power, other than a power
for medical care, be witnessed by at least two persons and recorded in the county of
the principal's residence. In addition, Chapter 404 amends § 36A to require that if
a power contains an indemnity and hold harmless clause, a third party must transact
business with the agent in the same manner as the third party would have transacted
business with the principal. However, no penalties are provided for a failure to
comply, and the provision does not absolve third parties from potential liability. For
alternative solutions to the problem of third-party refusal, see infra notes 45-50 and
accompanying text.
30 Act of Mar. 29, 1988, ch. 343, 1988 Va. Acts 414 (amending VA. CODE ANN.
§ 11-9.2 (Michie 1989)). This amendment, in a sense, brings Virginia full circle.
Virginia was a pioneer in the use of durable powers, and its durable power statute
was the model for the UPC. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 5-501 to -505 prefatory
note, 8 U.L.A. 511-12 (1983).
31 Act effective July 1, 1988, ch. 210, 1988 N.Y. Laws 2159 (codified at N.Y.
GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-1602 (McKinney 1989)); Act of Nov. 18,1988, Am. Sub. S.B.
228, 1988 Ohio Laws 990, 1005-06 (amending OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1337.09
(Anderson Supp. 1989)). The New York and Ohio provisions are broader than UPC
§ 5-501. Not only do they permit the agent's authority to spring into effect upon
incapacity, but they also provide that the authority may become effective at a
specified time or upon any other contingency. For a similar broadly defined
springing power, see ILL ANN. STAT. ch. 110 1/2, para. 802-4(a) (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1992).
32 Act effective Oct. 1, 1990, ch. 232, § 24, 1990 Fla. Laws 1729, 1749-50
(amending FLA. STAT. ANN. § 709.08 (West Supp. 1991)). Although a nonrelative
may now act as agent, notice of the power's execution must be mailed to the
principal's spouse, or if none, to the principal's adult natural or adopted children. Id.
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However, the adopting states were notable for their continued
failure to update their statutes. For example, instead of enacting the
current version of the UPC's durable power provisions, Hawaii
enacted the 1979 version and Oklahoma enacted the 1984 version.
33
Only Montana and North Dakota updated their statutes by adding
the 1987 amendmentY
The adopting states also continued their drift away from the
official text. Indiana repealed its version of the uniform act,3s and
California added a provision clarifying that a principal may specify
the procedures for determining incapacity.36 New Mexico added an
optional statutory form, 37 and South Carolina amended its statute to
authorize the granting of health care authority. 38
The biggest shift away from the UPC occurred in Missouri,
which discarded its existing statute, enacted a new statute unlike any
other, and still managed to retain its listing as a uniform durable
33 See supra note 25.
34 Act approved Apr. 20, 1989, ch. 582, § 24, 1989 Mont. Laws 1433, 1444-45
(amending MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-5-501 (1991)); Act approved Apr. 13, 1989, ch.
401, §§ 11-12, 1989 N.D. Laws 1109, 1114 (amending N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 30.1-30-
01 to -02 (Supp. 1991)). For a description of the 1987 amendment, see supra note
22.
35 Act effective July 1, 1991, Pub. L. 149, § 6, 1991 Ind. Acts 2258, 2309
(repealing IND. CODE ANN. §§ 30-2-11-1 to -7 (Burns 1989)). The new Indiana
durable power of attorney statute, which is not based on the uniform act, is codified
at IND. CODE ANN. § 30-5-1-1 to -10-4 (Burns Supp. 1992). For a brief summary of
some of its provisions relating to health care, see infra note 121.
36 Act approved Sept. 17, 1990, ch. 986, § 6, 1990 Cal. Legis. Serv. 3603, 3615-16
(West) (adding CAL CIV. CODE § 2514 (West Supp. 1992)). The new statute
provides that a springing power may be made dependent upon an event other than
incapacity, that the principal may designate one or more persons to have conclusive
authority to determine whether the triggering event has occurred, and that third
parties may rely on such determinations. Id.
37 Act approved Apr. 5, 1989, ch. 252, § 29, 1989 N.M. Laws 1448, 1496-1502
(amending N.M. STAT. ANN. § 45-5-501 (Michie 1989)). For a discussion of the New
Mexico and other statutory short-forms, see infra text accompanying notes 51-79.
38 See infra note 121 and accompanying text.
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power state. 39 The Missouri statute looks to guardianship law for
guidance.40 However, it also prescribes standards of conduct similar
to those required of a trustee41 and expands Missouri's accounting
procedure. 42 Furthermore, it permits a principal to give the agent
general powers and then defines the scope of that authority in
detail. 43 Yet it carefully requires that specific authority be granted
39 Durable Power of Attorney Law of Missouri, H.B. 145, sec. A, §§ 1-16, 1989
Mo. Laws 942, 964-74 (codified as amended at Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 404.700-.735
(Vernon 1990 & Supp. 1992). The act repealed the previous durable power
provisions, which were codified at Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 486.550-.595 (Vernon 1987)
(repealed 1989). For a reference to Missouri's continued status, see UNIF. DURABLE
POWER OF ATrORNEY AcT general statutory note, 8A U.L.A. 89 (Supp. 1991). For
a detailed discussion of the Missouri act, see Leo E. Eickhoff, Jr., New Durable
Power Law and Custodial Trust Act Amendments, 45 J. Mo. B. 329 (1989).
40 Persons who would be ineligible to act as the principal's guardian or
conservator are ineligible to act as agents and, if appointed, are subject to removal.
See Mo. ANN. STAT. § 404.707 (Vernon 1990). The primary effect of the new
requirement is to disqualify as agents the owners and operators of health care
facilities, unless related to the principal. See id. § 475.055.2 (Vernon Supp. 1992)
(guardian and conservator qualifications). The disqualification of health care and
residential care providers, operators, and employees is a common feature of the
recent statutory form durable power for health care enactments. See infra text
accompanying notes 200-10.
41 An agent is required to act in good faith and in the principal's best interest.
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 404.710.5 (Vernon Supp. 1992). An agent may not commingle
the principal's assets with the agent's own. Id. § 404.712 (Vernon 1990). An agent
has a duty to avoid conflicts of interest, to proceed as a prudent person, and to keep
in regular contact with the principal. Id. § 404.714. An agent may delegate authority
but is not discharged from responsibility for the authorities delegated. Id. §
404.723.1.
42 The principal may petition the court for an accounting. If the principal is
incapacitated, the petition may be filed by a legal representative, by an adult family
member, or by any other interested person. Id. § 404.727.1. The court may ratify
transactions, prohibit transactions, terminate the power, remove the agent, or issue
any other appropriate orders. Id. § 404.727.5. The prior statute only required an
accounting following the appointment of a conservator or, in the event of the
principal's death, the appointment of a personal representative. See id. § 486.585.1
(Vernon 1987) (repealed 1989).
43 By merely stating in the power that an agent is given general powers, the
principal grants the agent all powers over the principal's estate and person which an
adult nondisabled person can delegate to an agent. Id. § 404.710.2 (Vernon Supp.
1992). Examples of such powers, all concerning financial matters, are also
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before an agent may engage in such matters as making gifts, funding
a trust, disclaiming interests in property, or nominating a guardian or
conservator."
The Missouri act's most important contribution, however, may
be the sweeping protections granted to third parties, protections that,
unlike the UPC, systematically undermine the excuses for refusing to
honor a power.4s A third party need not inquire into, among other
things, the validity of a power's creation,46 the scope of an agent's
authority,47 the propriety of an agent's actions, 48 or the authority of
an agent under a springing power 9.4  The act fails, however, to
impose liability upon third parties who refuse to honor a power. This
omission is significant. Forcing reliance by imposing liability may be
the only way to catch the attention of third parties and to make the
enumerated in the statute. See id. § 404.710.4.
44 Id. § 404.710.6. The other powers that require specific authorization include
creating or revoking a trust, changing survivorship interests or beneficiaries,
consenting to an autopsy, or making anatomical gifts and other health care decisions.
Id. However, a principal may never delegate the authority to make or revoke a will.
Id. § 404.710.7.
45 For a discussion of the UPC's approach to third party protection, see supra
notes 21-24 and accompanying text.
46 A third party without actual knowledge has no duty to inquire into the validity
of an agent's designation, the capacity of the principal at the time of execution, or
the possible subjection of the principal to undue influence or fraud. Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 404.719.1 (Vernon 1990). Similarly, Illinois waives the duty to inquire into the
validity of the execution and into the principal's capacity at the time of execution, but
does not specifically address undue influence or fraud. See ILL ANN. STAT. ch. 110
1/2, para. 802-8 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1992).
47 The scope of an agent's authority is now of less concern because a third party
may deal freely with the agent whether or not the proposed act, transaction, or
decision is authorized in the power. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 404.710.8 (Vernon Supp.
1992).
48 The act provides that a third party has no duty to inquire into "[t]he propriety
of any act of the attorney in fact or successor in the principal's behalf." Id.
§ 404.719.1(4) (Vernon 1990). Illinois likewise provides that a third party may
presume that the actions of an agent conform to the standards prescribed by its
statute, one of which requires that an agent exercise due care for the principal's
benefit. See ILL ANN. STAT. ch. 110 1/2, paras. 802-7, -8 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1992).
49 A third party has no duty to inquire whether an event making effective an
agent's authority has occurred. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 404.719.1(5) (Vernon 1990).
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durable power a fully effective device.50
III. TIIE STATUTORY SHORT-FORM
A statutory short-form power of attorney is just as its name
describes. The form itself is set out in the statute. It is also short.
Instead of spelling out the powers of the agent in detail, a statutory
short-form contains a series of blanket phrases such as "real estate
transactions" or "stock and bond transactions." The phrases are
defined not in the form but elsewhere in the statute. Pursuant to the
form's directions, the principal delegates powers to the agent merely
by initialing or checking a box next to a phrase, or, in other variants,
by simply not striking a phrase.5' The statutory definitions of the
phrases that the principal selects are thereby incorporated by
reference into the power.
50 "The most important factor for an effective agency regime (apart from
durability, itself) is reasonable protection for third parties who rely in good faith on
the agent's authority, coupled with sanctions for arbitrary or unreasonable refusal to
deal with an authorized agent." Zartman, supra note 21, at 17. For an example of
such a provision, see ILL ANN. STAT. ch. 110 1/2, para. 802-8 (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1992).
51 See ALAsKA STAT. § 13.26.332 (Supp. 1991) (agent granted all listed powers
except to extent lines are drawn through particular categories and boxes next to
those categories are initialed); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 1-43(a) (West Supp. 1992)
(agent granted all listed powers except to extent particular categories are struck and
boxes next to those categories are initialed); ILL ANN. STAT. ch. 110 1/2, para. 803-3
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1992) (agent granted all listed powers except to extent particular
categories are struck); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 523.23 (West 1990) (agent granted
powers that the principal has either checked or "x-ed"); NEB. REV. STAT. § 49-1522
(1988) (agent granted powers that principal has marked); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 45-5-
501(B) (Michie 1989) (agent granted powers that principal has initialed); N.Y. GEN.
OBUG. LAW § 5-1501 (1) (McKinney 1989) (agent granted all listed powers except to
extent particular categories are struck and boxes next to those categories are
initialed); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 32A-1 (1991) (agent granted powers that principal has
initialed); UNIF. STATUTORY FORM POWER OF ATTORNEY ACT § 1, 8A U.L.A. 329-
31 (Supp. 1992) (agent granted powers that principal has initialed).
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The statutory short-form is not a new concept; it was first
enacted in New York in 194852 and duplicated in Connecticut in
1965.53  It has, however, taken off within the last several years.
There were four additions between 1983 and 198 7,S4 and Alaska,
Nebraska, and New Mexico were added to the list during 1988 and
1989.11 Furthermore, in 1988 the Uniform Law Commissioners
approved the Uniform Statutory Form Power of Attorney Act,56
which California adopted in 1990, although not without significant
substantive change.5 7 This activity is in addition to the many recent
52 Act approved Mar. 23, 1948, ch. 422, 1948 N.Y. Laws 764 (recodified as
amended at N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW §§ 5-1501 to -1504 (McKinney 1989 & Supp.
1992)).
53 Connecticut Statutory Short Form Power of Attorney Act, Pub. Act 573, 1965
Conn. Pub. Acts 784 (codified as amended at CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 1-42 to -56
(West 1988 & Supp. 1992)). For a discussion of a 1990 amendment, see infra note
68 and accompanying text.
54 Act approved July 18, 1984, ch. 602, 1984 Cal. Stat. 2294 (repealed 1990);
Statutory Short Form Power of Attorney for Property Law, Pub. Act 85-701, Art. III,
1987 Ill. Laws 2930, 2933-40 (codified as amended at ILL ANN. STAT. ch. 110 1/2,
paras. 803-1 to -4 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1992)); Act approved Apr. 26, 1984, ch. 603,
§§ 25-27,1984 Minn. Laws 1405,1411-35 (codified as amended at MINN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 523.23-.25 (West 1990)); Act of June 27, 1983, ch. 626, 1983 N.C. Sess. Laws 563,
563-67 (codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 32A-1 to -3 (1991)). For the
current California statute, see infra note 57 and accompanying text.
55 Act approved June 6, 1988, ch. 109, 1988 Alaska Sss. Laws (codified at
ALASKA STAT. §§ 13.26.332-.356 (Supp. 1991)); Nebraska Short Form Act, Leg. B.
475, 1988 Neb. Laws 419 (codified at NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 49-1501 to -1561 (1988));
Act approved Apr. 5, 1989, ch. 252, § 29, 1989 N.M. Laws 1448, 1496-1502
(amending N.M. STAT. ANN. § 45-5-501 (Michie 1989)).
56 The Commissioners acknowledged that their act was drawn in part from the
short-form statutes in effect in California, Illinois, Minnesota, and New York. UNIF.
STATUTORY FORM POWER OF ATTORNEY Acr prefatory note, 8A U.L.A. 328
(Supp. 1992).
57 Act approved Sept. 17, 1990, ch. 986, §§ 1-3, 1990 Cal. Legis. Serv. 3603,
3604-14 (West) (adding CAL- CIV. CODE §§ 2475-2499.5 (West Supp. 1992),
amending CAL CIv. CODE § 2450, and repealing §§ 2451-2473 (West Supp. 1990)).
Substantive differences between the uniform act and its California version include
the modification of the form to permit the designation of co-agents, and the addition
of a provision clarifying that an agent lacks authority to modify a trust unless the
power of attorney expressly so provides. See CAL CIv. CODE §§ 2475, 2499.5 (West
Supp. 1992); UNIF. STATUTORY FORM POWER OF ATTORNEY AcT § 1, 8A U.L.A.
329-31 (Supp. 1992).
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statutory form enactments directed exclusively at health care matters,
which are dealt with later in this article.58
The short-form statutes were enacted with good intentions.
First, because the form is simple and standard, individuals who might
not otherwise seek legal help may be more inclined to execute a
power of attorney. Second, the availability of an officially sanctioned
form will reduce the reluctance of third parties to honor powers of
attorney.5 9 Finally, the addition of a statutory form purports to help
satisfy the growing interest in durable powers. 60
58 See infra text accompanying notes 124-266.
59 The Commissioners note that their form will be supported by the express
authority of the enacting states. They hope that the form will become both familiar
and readily accepted. UNIF. STATUTORY FORM POWER OF ATTORNEY AcT
prefatory note, 8A U.L.A. 328 (Supp. 1992).
The declared purpose of the Illinois Power of Attorney Act, which added both
property and health care forms, is, among other things, to empower an agent to act
throughout the principal's lifetime and, by protecting third parties, to make certain
that third parties will honor the agent's authority at all times. ILL ANN. STAT. ch.
110 1/2, para. 802-1 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1992). For a detailed discussion of the
Illinois act, see James N. Zartman, The New Illinois Power of Attorney Act, 76 ILL
BJ. 546 (1988); James N. Zartman, Illinois Power of Attorney Act, 13 S. ILL U.L.J.
1 (1988).
60 The Commissioners note that the new act includes a durable power of
attorney option because of the growing interest in durable powers and the fact that
the use of these powers is recommended by other uniform acts. UNIF. STATUTORY
FORM POWER OF ATTORNEY AcT prefatory note, 8 U.L.A. 329 (Supp. 1992). The
new uniform act, however, does not include a comprehensive durable power form.
Despite the availability of a springing power option under UPC § 5-501, springing
powers are not mentioned in the form. Several of the other forms also fail to
mention either springing or nondurable powers. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 1-43 (West 1988 & Supp. 1992) (no mention of durable power, springing power, or
nondurable power; power is nondurable unless form is modified); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 523.23 (West 1990) (no mention of springing power); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 45-5-
501(B) (Michie 1989) (no mention of nondurable power); N.Y. GEN. OBUG. LAW §
5-1501(1) (McKinney 1989) (no mention of durable power, springing power, or
nondurable power; power is nondurable unless form is modified). The durable
power concept is omitted from the Connecticut and New York forms because both
predate the UPC, which was approved in 1969. See supra notes 52-53 and
accompanying text.
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It is too early to tell whether the statutory forms will produce
the envisioned panacea. But one thing is certain: several of the
forms fail to mention a number of standard options often included in
a durable power of attorney. Perhaps this omission was made
deliberately to provide a simple form for the lay public. On the
other hand, a simple form can lead to complex problems. For
instance, the failure to name a co-agent or successor agent can force
the appointment of a guardian or conservator if the office of agent
becomes vacant. Yet, a person who slavishly follows the format of
the recent Nebraska and uniform act forms would be unaware of the
possibility of naming multiple or successor agents. 61 The recently
enacted Alaska and New Mexico forms, on the other hand, clearly
indicate those possibilities. 62 Assuming a principal has surmounted
that hurdle and has modified the form to provide for alternates,
occasions may still arise in which the appointment of a guardian or
conservator may be necessary, such as when a third party refuses to
61 The uniform act form provides, " I (insert your name
and address) appoint (insert the name and address of the
person appointed) as my agent (attorney-in-fact) .... ." UNIF. STATUTORY FORM
POWER OF ATrORNEY ACT § 1(a), 8A U.L.A. 329-31 (Supp. 1992). The Nebraska
form is similar but a bit more elaborate in its designation of "the lawful and true
Agent and attorney-in-fact for Principal." NEB. REV. STAT. § 49-1522 (1988).
Neither form mentions successor agents. Because there is no mention of multiple
agents, neither form reaches the question of whether multiple agents may act
independently or must instead act jointly.
62 The Alaska form solves the single versus multiple agent question through the
simple expediency of adding the phrases "agent or agents" and "attorney(s)-in-fact."
ALASKA STAT. § 13.26.332 (Supp. 1991). The New Mexico form provides for the
appointment of"attorney(s)-in-fact." N.M. STAT. ANN. § 45-5-501 (B) (Michie 1989).
In addition, both forms provide for the appointment of successor agents and require
the principal to elect whether multiple agents must act jointly or may act individually.
ALASKA STAT. §§ 13.26.332, -.335 (Supp. 1991); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 45-5-501(B)
(Michie 1989).
None of the earlier forms provide for the appointment of both multiple and
successor agents. The forms in Connecticut, Minnesota, and New York provide for
the appointment of multiple agents but not successor agents; the Illinois form
provides for the appointment of successor agents but not multiple agents; and the
North Carolina form provides for neither multiple nor successor agents. CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 1-43(a) (West Supp. 1992); ILL ANN. STAT. ch. 110 1/2, para. 803-3
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1992); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 523.23 (West 1990); N.Y. GEN.
OBLIG. LAW § 5-1501(1)(a) (McKinney 1989); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 32A-1 (1991).
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honor the power.63 Of the recent forms, only Alaska makes
provision for the nominating of a guardian or conservator. 6
Furthermore, the menu of powers from which a principal may
select is not necessarily comprehensive. Despite the growing interest
in durable powers of attorney for the principal's health care,
Nebraska authorizes the agent to make health care decisions for the
principal's relatives, but not for the principal. 6 The Alaska and
New Mexico forms, though, deal exclusively with the principal's
health care,66 including, in the case of New Mexico, the withdrawal
or withholding of life-sustaining treatment. 67 With the exception of
63 For a list of some of the reasons given by third parties for a refusal to honor
a power, see supra text accompanying note 24. Other reasons for the nomination of
a guardian or conservator are discussed supra note 19.
64 ALASKA STAT. § 13.26.335 (Supp. 1991). The Illinois form also authorizes the
nomination of a guardian. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110 1/2, para. 803-3 (Smith-Hurd
Supp. 1992).
65 Nebraska, under its category, "General Power for Domestic and Personal
Concerns," authorizes the agent "to consent to or permit any dental, medical, or
surgical operation or treatment or other mental or physical analysis, examination,
observation, procedure, test, or treatment." NEB. REV. STAT. § 49-1549 (1988).
That authority appears, however, as one of a series of powers that relate to "any
domestic or personal need, requirement, or want of any child, dependent, friend,
parent, relative, spouse, or other person." Id.
66 Alaska specifically empowers the principal to authorize the agent to handle
"health care services." ALASKA STAT. § 13.26.332 (Supp. 1991). The definition of
health care services provides that an agent may "consent or refuse to consent to
medical care," receive and disclose information, "grant releases," "consent or refuse
to consent to" psychiatric care, and "arrange for care ... [and] lodging." Id.
§ 13.26.344(l). The agent, however, is not authorized to unilaterally authorize the
withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment, but may enforce a living will.
Id. Consent to voluntary commitment in a mental health facility, electric shock,
psychosurgery, sterilization, or abortion is prohibited. Id.
67 A principal may authorize an agent to make decisions regarding medical
treatment and nursing home care, to make "decisions regarding lifesaving and life
prolonging" treatment, and to make gifts to the "principal's spouse for the purpose
of qualifying ... for governmental medical assistance." N.M. STAT. ANN. § 45-5-
501(B) (Michie 1989).
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Connecticut," the other statutory forms omit the topic. The drafters
of the uniform act deliberately omitted mention of health care
because they viewed it as a topic best left for separate legislation.6 9
Of all the states that have enacted statutory short-forms, only
California, Illinois, New York, and North Carolina have enacted such
separate legislation. 0
Even if a principal has successfully navigated through the form
and has made the appropriate modifications," a quality product is
not assured. A final assessment will depend on the quality of the
statutory definitions that detail the agent's powers.72 Alaska's
" Connecticut, in 1990, amended its form to provide that a principal may
authorize an agent to make "health care decisions." CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 1-43
(West Supp. 1992). The agent's authority to make health care decisions commences
upon a determination by the attending physician that the principal is unable to
evaluate information effectively or to communicate health care decisions rationally
or effectively. The authority, however, does not extend to decisions to withdraw life-
support, nutrition or hydration, or care designed for physical comfort. Id. § 1-54a.
69 The Commissioners concluded that health care matters were best left to
separate legislation "[s]ince they involve intensely controversial personal as well as
economic considerations." UN1F. STATUTORY FORM POWER OF ATTORNEY ACT
prefatory note, 8A U.L.A. 328 (Supp. 1992).
70 For a detailed discussion of the statutory form health care powers in those
and other jurisdictions, see infra text accompanying notes 124-266.
71 With the exception of Minnesota, all of the statutory short-forms permit the
principal to add powers or to make other modifications. The Minnesota form
expressly disallows the insertion of modifications, and the statute requires that the
form and its wording be duplicated exactly. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 523.23 (West
1990) (form and statute).
72 All of the statutory forms contain a standard list of property-related powers,
which are traceable to the New York statute, the first short-form act. The following
are the New York statutory powers:
(A) real estate transactions;
(B) chattel and goods transactions;
(C) bond, share and commodity transactions;
(D) banking transactions;
(E) business operating transactions;
(F) insurance transactions;
(G) estate transactions;
(H) claims and litigation;
(I) personal relationships and affairs;
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definitions are understandable, at least to an attorney, 3 as are the
uniform act's.74 New Mexico's definitions are much easier to
analyze for one important reason: they do not exist. The New
Mexico legislature simply added a short statutory form but neglected
to enact the statutory definitions. 5 Nebraska, on the other hand,
went to the other extreme: total obfuscation. To save space, each
definition incorporates by reference a variety of so-called "specific
authorities," which are defined elsewhere in the statute. 6  The
(J) benefits from military service;
(K) records, reports and statements;
(L) full and unqualified authority to my attorney(s)-in-fact to delegate
any or all of the foregoing powers to any person or persons
whom my attorney(s)-in-fact shall select;
(M) all other matters.
N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-1501 (1) (McKinney 1989). The meaning of the powers
is then spelled out in § 5-1502. Id. at § 5-1502 (McKinney 1989 & Supp. 1992).
73 The powers enumerated in the Alaska form and the supporting statutory
definitions closely follow New York's, supra note 72, except that the Alaska form also
permits the principal to authorize the agent to handle "health care services." See
ALASKA STAT. § 13.26.332 (Supp. 1991) (form); id. § 13.26.344 (definitions). For the
definition of health care services, see supra note 66.
74 The uniform act's enumerated powers and definitions are similar to New
York's, supra note 72, with two differences. The uniform act creates separate
categories for tax and retirement matters and, to save space, adds a provision
entitled "Construction of Powers Generally." This general provision covers such
matters as the power to sue and defend, to hire and reimburse other agents, and to
file documents that the agent considers desirable to safeguard the principal's interest.
See UNIF. STATUTORY FORM POWER OF ATTORNEY ACT § 3, 8A U.L.A. 332 (Supp.
1992). Tax and retirement matters are also listed as separate categories in the
Illinois form. See ILL ANN. STAT. ch. 110 1/2, para. 803-3 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1992).
75 Except for health care, the powers listed in the New Mexico form do not
significantly vary from those in New York, supra note 72. For a list of New Mexico's
health-related powers, see supra note 67. For the other powers, see N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 45-5-501(B) (Michie 1989).
76 The confusion does not start with the definitions but with the form. A
principal must first determine whether the power is to be a durable power of
attorney and a contingent durable power of attorney, a durable power of attorney
and a present durable power of attorney, or a nondurable power of attorney, all of
which are undefined in the form. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 49-1522 (1988).
The principal must then decide which powers to grant. An agent may be
granted plenary power, plenary power subject to limitations, or one or more of 12
general powers. The general powers largely track the New York list except for the
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Nebraska statute does contain one redeeming feature, however; it
includes a form for revoking a short-form power."
None of the newest short-form statutes is adequate. Excellent
forms and precise definitions are not enough. To function as an
alternative to an attorney-prepared document, the statutory form
must, somehow, fulfill the attorney's counseling function. The only
advice the most recent forms give is, by and large, a warning that the
granted powers are sweeping and a suggestion that the reader seek
independent advice if questions arise. 78 The 1987 Illinois form is
addition of a general power for "Proprietary Interests and Materials," a power
relating to intellectual property. See id. §§ 49-1522, -1553.
Each general power definition incorporates by reference varying numbers of
up to 20 specific authorities, none of which appear in the form. They include
specific authorities for acquisitions; ancillary matters; assistants; claims; compensa-
tion; contracts; disclosure, names, and signatures; dispositions; documents;
encumbrances; improvements; insolvency proceedings; investments; maintenance;
proceeds; reimbursements; reorganizations; reports; taxes; and trusts. See id. §§ 49-
1522, -1525 to -1556.
77 Id. § 49-1559.
78 The following are the texts of the "warnings" given in the most recent forms:
THE POWERS GRANTED FROM THE PRINCIPAL TO THE
AGENT OR AGENTS IN THE FOLLOWING DOCUMENT ARE
VERY BROAD. THEY MAY INCLUDE THE POWER TO DIS-
POSE, SELL, CONVEY, AND ENCUMBER YOUR REAL AND
PERSONAL PROPERTY, AND THE POWER TO MAKE YOUR
HEALTH CARE DECISIONS. ACCORDINGLY, THE FOLLOW-
ING DOCUMENT SHOULD ONLY BE USED AFTER CAREFUL
CONSIDERATION. IF YOU HAVE ANY QUESTIONS ABOUT
THIS DOCUMENT, YOU SHOULD SEEK COMPETENT ADVICE.
YOU MAY REVOKE THIS POWER OF ATTORNEY AT ANY
TIME.
ALASKA STAT. § 13.26.332 (Supp. 1991).
NOTICE: CONSULT YOUR LAWYER TO DETERMINE THE
LEGAL EFFECT OF THE USE OF THIS NEBRASKA STATU-
TORY SHORT FORM.
NEB. REV. STAT. § 49-1505(6) (1988).
THE POWERS GRANTED BY THIS DOCUMENT ARE BROAD
AND SWEEPING. THIS FORM, THE NEW MEXICO STATU-
TORY SHORT FORM UNDER SECTION 45-5-502 [sic] NMSA 1978,
DOES NOT PROHIBIT THE USE OF ANY OTIIER FORM.
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 45-5-501(B) (Michie 1989).
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the only statutory short-form that makes a significant effort to explain
the purpose of a power of attorney and the functions of an agent,
instead of merely providing the mechanics. 79 Overall, the more
NOTICE: THE POWERS GRANTED BY THIS DOCUMENT ARE
BROAD AND SWEEPING. THEY ARE EXPLAINED IN THE
UNIFORM STATUTORY FORM POWER OF ATTORNEY ACT.
IF YOU HAVE ANY QUESTIONS ABOUT THESE POWERS, OB-
TAIN COMPETENT LEGAL ADVICE. THIS DOCUMENT DOES
NOT AUTHORIZE ANYONE TO MAKE MEDICAL AND OTHER
HEALTH-CARE DECISIONS FOR YOU. YOU MAY REVOKE
THIS POWER OF ATTORNEY IF YOU LATER WISH TO DO SO.
UNIF. STATUTORY FORM POWER OF ATTORNEY ACT § 1, 8A U.L.A. 152-53 (Supp.
1991).
79 The following is the text of the Illinois warning for its property power. A
separate warning is provided for its health care power:
(NOTICE: THE PURPOSE OF THIS POWER OF ATYORNEY IS
TO GIVE THE PERSON YOU DESIGNATE (YOUR "AGENT")
BROAD POWERS TO HANDLE YOUR PROPERTY, WHICH
MAY INCLUDE POWERS TO PLEDGE, SELL OR OTHERWISE
DISPOSE OF ANY REAL OR PERSONAL PROPERTY WITHOUT
ADVANCE NOTICE TO YOU OR APPROVAL BY YOU. THIS
FORM DOES NOT IMPOSE A DUTY ON YOUR AGENT TO
EXERCISE GRANTED POWERS; BUT WHEN POWERS ARE
EXERCISED, YOUR AGENT WILL HAVE TO USE DUE CARE
TO ACT FOR YOUR BENEFIT AND IN ACCORDANCE WITH
THIS FORM AND KEEP A RECORD OF RECEIPTS, DISBURSE-
MENTS AND SIGNIFICANT ACTIONS TAKEN AS AGENT. A
COURT CAN TAKE AWAY TIE POWERS OF YOUR AGENT IF
IT FINDS THE AGENT IS NOT ACTING PROPERLY. YOU MAY
NAME SUCCESSOR AGENTS UNDER THIS FORM BUT NOT
CO-AGENTS. UNLESS YOU EXPRESSLY LIMIT THE DURA-
TION OF THIS POWER IN THE MANNER PROVIDED BELOW,
UNTIL YOU REVOKE THIS POWER OR A COURT ACTING ON
YOUR BEHALF TERMINATES IT, YOUR AGENT MAY EXER-
CISE THE POWERS GIVEN HERE THROUGHOUT YOUR
LIFETIME, EVEN AFTER YOU BECOME DISABLED. THE
POWERS YOU GIVE YOUR AGENT ARE EXPLAINED MORE
FULLY IN SECTION 3-4 OF THE ILLINOIS "STATUTORY
SHORT FORM POWER OF ATTORNEY FOR PROPERTY LAW'
OF WHICH THIS FORM IS A PART (SEE THE BACK OF THIS
FORM). THAT LAW EXPRESSLY PERMITS TIlE USE OF ANY
DIFFERENT FORM OF POWER OF ATIORNEY YOU MAY
DESIRE. IF THERE IS ANYTHING ABOUT TI-IS FORM THAT
YOU DO NOT UNDERSTAND, YOU SHOULD ASK A LAWYER
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recent statutory forms do not represent progress, but rather a step
backwards.
IV. TIlE DURABLE POWER BANK ACCOUNT 80
A joint tenancy bank account can be one of the probate
lawyer's biggest nightmares. The signature card states that the
survivor takes the entire account, but following the depositor's death
the attorney may discover that the depositor did not intend to create
a true joint tenancy. Instead, the depositor created the account for
purposes of "convenience." The other joint tenant was supposed to
have authority to pay the depositor's bills but was not to receive the
funds at the depositor's death. Litigation then ensues to determine
whether the evidence of that intent is sufficient to rebut the
presumption that the signature card controls. 8'
This problem has persisted for decades despite continued calls
for clarifying legislation and pleas to bankers to exercise care in
handing out joint tenancy signature cards. 82 The durable power is
TO EXPLAIN IT TO YOU.)
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110 1/2, para. 803-3 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1992) (footnote
omitted). Other helpful hints are contained in the form. See id.
80 The legislation discussed in this section applies to commercial banks and,
depending on the jurisdiction, to credit unions, savings banks, and savings and loan
associations. The terms "bank" and "bankers" are, therefore, used generically and for
ease of reference and are not strictly limited to their institutional setting.
81 This type of litigation is voluminous. For a collection of the cases, see Gary
D. Spivey, Annotation, Creation of Joint Savings Account or Savings Certificate as Gift
to Survivor, 43 A.L.R. 3d 971 (1972). Litigation has traditionally arisen because
"[t]he contract between the bank and the depositor only instructs the bank to make
payment to designated parties. It does not determine ownership of the depositor's
interest in any manner." Donald Kepner, Five More Years of the Joint Bank Account
Muddle, 26 U. CHI. L. REV. 376, 386 (1959).
82 See, e.g., N. William Hines, Personal Property Joint Tenancies: More Law, Fact
and Fancy, 54 MINN. L. REV. 509, 528, 530, 552-59 (1970) (comments that existing
banking and property laws consistently fail to facilitate a depositor's intention, notes
the general unavailability of "convenience" account arrangements, and calls for
legislation that would provide for standardized account forms, including a
convenience rider); Michael L. Johnson, Survivorship Interests with Persons Other
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an excellent alternative for bankers to consider. A depositor may
grant an agent authority to pay bills without granting the agent an
ownership interest, and the agency may survive into incapacity, when
it is most needed. The durable power option has yet to take hold,
however.83 Perhaps that is because of a lack of readily available
account forms 84 and because banks fear potential liability for
making payments after the principal's death,85 a concern that does
not apply if a joint account is substituted. 86
Than a Spouse: The Costs of Probate Avoidance, 20 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 985,
1002-07 (1985) (bemoans the failure to seek professional advice in the creation of
nonspousal joint tenancies and the inadequate explanations by bank employees; calls
for and supplies a form of joint tenancy account disclosure statement); Kepner, supra
note 81, at 403-04 (requests that banks permit joint accounts without survivorship
and calls for legislation that distinguishes between the convenience and gift joint
accounts).
83 Professor McGovern expressed a dissenting view. William M. McGovern, Jr.,
The Payable on Death Account and Other Will Substitutes, 67 Nw. U. L. REV. 7
(1972). He noted that some institutions were careful to warn against the dangers of
convenience accounts and made an effort to supply power of attorney forms. Id. at
18. Yet the author of this article, who practiced in Chicago for eight years, found
that power of attorney bank accounts were rarely encountered and then only if the
client had made a special request.
84 See, e.g., In re Creekmore's Estate, 135 N.E.2d 193 (N.Y. 1956), in which the
decedent's attorney was told at a savings bank from which he requested power of
attorney forms, "that the bank was opposed to accepting powers of attorney, that
they did so only under protest, that they had no power of attorney forms available,
and recommended that the accounts be changed to joint accounts." Id. at 194-95.
85 The UPC's general durable power provisions, for example, protect a bank in
following an agent's direction until the bank has actual knowledge of the principal's
death, or, in the case of a nondurable power, until it has actual knowledge of the
principal's death or incapacity. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 5-504, 8 U.L.A. 516
(1983). However, the statute does not define "actual knowledge." If a bank
employee habitually clips obituary notices, would the employee's actual knowledge
be instantly imputed to the bank and to all of its branches?
86 Under traditional bank protection statutes, a bank could not incur liability for
making payments in accordance with the account contract. For a detailed discussion,
see Donald Kepner, The Joint Survivorship Bank Account--A Concept Without a
Name, 41 CAL. L. REV. 596, 604-12 (1953). Under the UPC's more modern
multiple-party account provisions in effect until 1989, the bank was protected until
it received a written notice that withdrawals in accordance with the account's terms
should not be permitted. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 6-112, 8 U.L.A. 532 (1983).
For the post-1988 protective provision, see infra note 100 and accompanying text.
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Although durable power bank accounts are rarely used, that
failure is not due to a lack of legislative attention. Wisconsin has
authorized the device since 197487 and Washington since 1981.91
However, since 1988, the durable power bank account has come into
its own, with the UPC and four additional states joining the list of
enacting jurisdictions.89 Of the four, the North Carolina approach
is the simplest in concept.9 It authorizes the creation of an agency
account that may survive incapacity,91 and it provides a form to use
in creating the account.92 Unfortunately, North Carolina does not
87 Act published June 15, 1974, ch. 291, § 12, 1973 Wis. Laws 829, 830-34
(codified as amended at Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 705.01-.08 (West 1981 & Supp. 1991)).
Under the Wisconsin statute, an account is automatically durable if the spouse is the
agent. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 705.02(2) (West 1981 & Supp. 1991). Otherwise, the
account contract or independent power of attorney must provide that the agency
survives the legal disability of a party to the account. Id. § 705.05(3) (West 1981).
88 Financial Institution Individual Account Deposit Act, ch. 192, 1981 Wash.
aws 866 (codified as amended at WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 30.22.010-.900 (West
1986 & Supp. 1991)). The Washington statute creatively responds to bankers'
concerns about liability for payments made after a depositor's death. Washington
protects a bank until it has had a reasonable opportunity to act following its receipt
of written notice-a notice that must be given to the manager or an officer of the
bank in which the account is maintained. Id. §§ 30.22.040(2), -.170 (West 1986).
Washington also incorporates a springing power concept. The contract creating an
agency account may provide that an agent's authority to receive payments or make
withdrawals continues in spite of, or arises by virtue of, the incompetency of the
depositor. Id. § 30.22.170.
Pre-1988 enactments are also in effect in Minnesota and Tennessee. Although
neither state expressly grants statutory authority to create a durable power bank
account, both the Minnesota and the Tennessee multiple-party account statutes
indirectly authorize the device by including cross-references to their general durable
power of attorney statutes. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 528.15 (West Supp. 1992); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 45-2-707 (Supp. 1991).
89 See infra notes 90-111 and accompanying text.
90 Act of July 8, 1988, ch. 1078, 1988 N.C. Sess. Laws 497 (codified as amended
in scattered titles of N.C. GEN. STAT.). The act includes disclosure statements that
must be provided to depositors opening joint accounts, trust accounts, and agency
accounts at banks, credit unions, and savings and loan associations. A separate set
of statutory provisions is provided for each type of financial institution.
91 See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 53-146.3(c) (Supp. 1991) (banks).
92 To create an agency account, a depositor must acknowledge that the funds
will pass to his or her estate, and that the agent has the right to sign checks and to
make deposits. Id. § 53-146.3(a).
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have a clear-cut test of bank liability. Instead, liability for payments
made after death depends upon whether the bank had "actual
knowledge" of the death.9
3
The most significant recent development in bank powers of
attorney is the 1989 revision of Article VI of the UPC,94 which
Colorado has already adopted.95  The UPC now authorizes a
depositor to create an agency account that may survive incapacity.
96
Unlike North Carolina, however, the UPC solution is not simple.
The UPC provides an omnibus form that covers not only the creation
of agency accounts, but also joint accounts, Totten trusts, and
payable-on-death accounts, which are referred to by different
terms.97 The form is complex, confusing,9 and, for all practical
93 Id. § 53-146.3(d). For a brief discussion of this test within the context of the
UPC, see supra note 85.
94 The provisions applicable to what are termed multiple-party accounts are now
located at UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 6-210 to -227, 8 U.L.A. 284-95 (Supp. 1991).
They have also been separately approved in the form of the UNIF. MULTIPLE-
PERSON ACCOUNTS ACT, 8A U.L.A. 131 (Supp. 1991). For the prior provisions, see
UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 6-101 to -113, 8 U.L.A. 520-33 (1983) (amended 1989).
95 Act approved May 31, 1990, ch. 116, § 1, 1990 Colo. Sess. Laws 908, 910-17
(codified at COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-15-201 to -227 (West Supp. 1991)).
Colorado adopted the uniform act without significant substantive change.
96 The UPC's new statutory account form requires the deposit to designate
whether the agency is to survive or terminate upon incapacity. UNIF. PROBATE
CODE § 6-204(a), 8 U.L.A. 286-87 (Supp. 1991).
97 Unlike the former multiple-party provisions, there is no provision for a Totten
trust account, joint account, or payable-on-death account, as such. Accounts are
either "multiple-party accounts" or "single-party accounts." A single-party account
may be created with or without a payable-on-death (POD) designation, and with or
without an agency designation. A multiple-party account may be created with or
without a right of survivorship, with or without a POD designation, and with or
without an agency designation. See id. §§ 6-201, -203 & cmts., 8 U.L.A. 284-86.
98 For the form see id. § 6-204(a), 8 U.L.A. 286-87. To successfully complete
the form, one must ask the following questions:
(1) Do I wish to create a single-party account or a multiple-party account?
(2) If a single-party account, do I wish it to be with or without a POD
designation?
(3) If a multiple-party account, do I wish to provide for (a) a right of
survivorship, (b) a right of survivorship and a POD designation, or (c)
no right of survivorship?
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purposes, mandatory." The new UPC provisions do, however,
respond to bankers' concerns about liability by providing that the
bank cannot be held liable until it has (1) received written notice to
stop payments and (2) had a reasonable opportunity to act upon the
notice. 100
The 1989 Connecticut and California statutes are the most
innovative of the recent attempts.10' Instead of merely providing a
statutory form or adding minor refinements relating to bank liability,
the statutes creating California's new special power of attorney
account and Connecticut's new durable power of attorney account
make an effort to respond to bankers' needs for simplicity and
certainty.
California and Connecticut accomplished these improvements,
in part, by enacting self-contained statutes. Bankers need no longer
look to the general durable power provisions or to other banking
statutes to locate fundamental principles. 112  The new acts even
cover the requirements for the creation or termination of a power of
(4) Do I wish to designate an agent and, if so, will the agency survive
incapacity or terminate upon incapacity?
99 The use of the form is not technically mandatory. The Commissioners note,
however, that the form is based upon the terminology used in the statute. In
addition, a financial institution that uses the statutory form "is protected in acting in
reliance on the form of the account." Id. § 6-204 cmt., 8 U.L.A. 287. One assumes,
therefore, that banks would play it safe and use the prescribed form.
100 Protection from liability ceases once the bank has had a reasonable
opportunity to act following its receipt of a written notice to the effect that payments
should not be permitted. Id. § 6-226(b), 8 U.L.A. 295. The Washington statute also
requires that the bank be given a reasonable opportunity to act. However, the
Washington statute, unlike the UPC, requires delivery of the notice to a responsible
officer at the pertinent branch. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 30.22.04(2), -.170 (West
1986). See discussion supra note 88.
10t Act approved Sept. 12, 1989, ch. 397, § 27, 1989 Cal. Stat. , - (codified
at CAL PROB. CODE § 5204 (West 1991)); Act approved May 10, 1989, Pub. Act 67,
1989 Conn. Acts 90 (Reg. Sess.) (codified at CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 1-56a to -
56b (West Supp. 1991)).
102 By contrast, North Carolina buried its agency provisions in its banking titles,
and the agency provisions of the UPC form an integral part of its multiple-party
account statute.
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attorney.103  Second, both states mandate a comprehensive but
straightforward form. Connecticut includes the form in its statute
and the California statute specifies in detail what the form must
contain. 10 4 Although neither statute prohibits alternate forms, it is
unlikely that banks will frequently offer their customers a choice,
because the acts' protections apply only if the prescribed form is
used. Moreover, bankers need not worry about explaining various
options. The only decision that the principal must make is whether
to create a power of attorney that may survive incapacity.t05
In addition, both statutes emphasize bank protection and
attempt to provide workable rules. The California statute protects
the bank by attempting to reduce the risk of mismanagement by the
agent. The statute holds the agent to a code of conduct that must be
set forth in the power. The agent must maintain books or records
that will permit an accounting, if one is demanded. 06 Furthermore,
the agent is liable for disbursements made without written authoriza-
103 For example, California specifically provides for termination of a power of
attorney upon revocation by the principal, termination of the account, death of the
principal, or appointment of a guardian or conservator for the principal's estate.
CAL PROB. CODE § 5204(d) (West 1991). Connecticut mentions death of the
principal and appointment of a conservator as terminating events. CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 1-56b(e) (West Supp. 1991).
104 California requires that a writing signed by the principal identify the agent
or agents, the financial institution, and the account or accounts subject to the power.
CAL PROB. CODE § 5204(b) (West 1991).
Connecticut, on the other hand, has an actual signature card form in its
statute. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 1-56b(a) (West Supp. 1991). Connecticut also
requires a separate agreement for each account. Id. The signature card permits the
principal to designate multiple agents and requires the principal to designate whether
multiple agents may act separately or must act jointly. Id. In addition, the signature
card contains standard language relating to the agent's authority to make deposits,
to sign account transaction documents, and to make withdrawals. Id.
105 Both statutes specifically provide that they are not to be construed to
prohibit other forms of powers of attorney. CAL PROB. CODE § 52040) (West
1991); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 1-56b(b) (West Supp. 1991). To stay within the
protections of its act, however, Connecticut requires that its statutory form be used.
CONN. GEN. STAT. Ann. § 1-56b(f) (West Supp. 1991). California permits
supplementation as long as the form contains the minimum required language. CAL
PROB. CODE § 5204(c) (West 1991).
106 CAL PROB. CODE § 5204(h) (West 1991).
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tion to persons other than the principal. 10 7 More importantly, a
bank enjoys absolute protection if it relies on a power that is filed
and valid on its face, and if the bank verified the signature.'08
Finally, California grants the bank a reasonable time in which to
respond following its receipt of written notice of termination. 1°9
Connecticut's bank protection provisions emphasize administra-
tive simplicity. For instance, Connecticut addresses the potentially
thorny problem of whether multiple agents may act independently or
must act jointly. Connecticut provides check processing departments
with a clear rule: joint action is required unless otherwise specified,
a requirement that is carefully specified in the prescribed form."0
In addition, Connecticut provides a workable rule for determining
liability for payments made after death by requiring written notice to
a responsible officer and a reasonable opportunity for the bank to
act. Furthermore, in no event does the bank have less than two
business days to respond following its receipt of notice."'
To some, the new California and Connecticut approaches may
appear overly protective of financial institutions. On the other hand,
durable power bank account statutes of this type may be the only
way to induce financial institutions to permit the designation of
agents and thereby end the inappropriate use of the joint tenancy
"convenience" account.
'07 Id. § 5204(i).
108 Id. § 5204(e). For a comparable provision that protects third parties who
rely on a power of attorney, no matter what type, see CAL. CIv. CODE § 2512(a)
(West Supp. 1991) (protection provided if power presented by agent named in
power, if power appears valid on its face, and if power includes a notary's certificate
of acknowledgment).
109 CAL PROB. CODE § 5204(g) (West 1991). California further provides that
no other information shown to have been available to the financial institution shall
affect the requirement that written notice be given. Id.
10 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 1-56b(a) (West Supp. 1991) (form); id. § 1-56b(c)
(statute).
"I Id. § 1-56b(f). The Connecticut rule is very precise. The notice must be
received by an officer at the institution's main office during regular business hours.
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V. THE DURABLE POWER FOR HEALTH CARE
A. Overview
Statutes authorizing durable powers of attorney for health care,
at a minimum, clarify that a principal may grant authority to an agent
to make health care decisions on the principal's behalf. Such
clarification may be unnecessary given the growing trend recognizing
that authority to delegate health care decisions may be implied from
a general durable power of attorney statute." 2 Nevertheless, the
perception that a legislative solution is required has, since 1982,113
compelled legislatures in forty-one jurisdictions to enact legislation
explicitly ratifying the use of durable powers of attorney for health
care.11 4
This rush to legislate is the product of several converging
influences. One influence is the growing recognition that it is better
for physicians to rely on a person selected by the patient than to rely
112 See, e.g., In re Peter, 529 A.2d 419, 426 (NJ. 1987) (general durable power
statute should be interpreted to permit the principal to authorize the making of
medical decisions); In re Westchester County Medical Center ex reL O'Connor, 531
N.E.2d 607, 612 n.2 (N.Y. 1988) (doctrine of nondelegable acts no longer bars
appointment of agent for purpose of communicating express desires as to
withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment); 73 Op. Att'y Gen. 162 (Md.
1988) (legislature, in several health statutes, recognized that a principal may grant an
agent authority to make health care decisions); 77 Op. Att'y Gen. 156 (Wis. 1988)
(nondelegation doctrine does not apply to health care powers).
113 Pennsylvania was the first state to authorize the use of a durable power to
implement health care decisions. Act approved Feb. 18, 1982, Act 26, § 9, 1982 Pa.
Laws 45, 65-71 (codified at 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 5601-5607 (Supp. 1991)).
For a brief description of the Pennsylvania statute, see infra note 121.
114 There is, unfortunately, no consistency among the statutes in the terminology
employed. The document signed by the principal is most often referred to as a
durable power of attorney for health care, but variations include health care power
of attorney, health care proxy, health care designation, and medical power of
attorney. In addition to the traditional agent or attorney in fact, the statutes refer to
surrogates, patient advocates, and representatives, and the principal is on occasion
termed a patient or grantor.
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on the family's uncertain authority.1 ' A related influence is the
recognition that the number of elderly persons without close family
is increasing and that guardianship may be a cumbersome alternative
at best.116 The strongest influence is the emerging consensus that
the existing living will statutes are inadequate. Many criticize living
will statutes for requiring the declarant to make a decision as to
future care far in advance, without knowledge of the particular
circumstances that may then exist. Under a durable power, however,
a competent person, the agent, can make an informed decision when
the health care is required." 7
I's The medical community's traditional reliance on the family is often based on
little more than medical custom. Whether a family member has such authority as a
matter of legal fact depends upon the relationship to the incapacitated person, the
nature of the specific treatment, and the jurisdiction's view on that question. See
Elaine B. Krasik, Comment, The Role of the Family in Medical Decisionmaking for
Incompetent Adult Patients:A Historical Perspective and Case Analysis, 48 U. PIT. L.
REV. 539 (1987). Moreover, even if family authority is accepted, deference to an
agent is preferred. The use of an agent avoids such questions as: who belongs to the
family; which family member is to make the decision; what happens if family
members disagree; what happens if a family member proceeds in bad faith or
ignorance; and how is the propriety of a family member's decision to be judged? See
generally Judith Areen, The Legal Status of Consent Obtained from Families ofAdult
Patients to Withhold or Withdraw Treatment, 258 J. AM. MED. Ass'n 229 (1987).
116 The Florida legislature, for example, explained the need for its 1990
enactment of detailed provisions authorizing the appointment of health care
surrogates for patients at hospitals, nursing homes, and hospices as follows: "The
Legislature finds that an increasing number of patients in hospitals or nursing homes
lack the capacity to provide express and informed consent for medical treatment and
surgical and diagnostic procedures. These patients may not have a family or a
guardian .. " Among the purposes of the act is to "[pirovide an alternative to the
guardianship process by which a person may designate a surrogate to make health
care decisions for him before any incapacity." Act approved July 2, 1990, ch. 232,
§ 11, 1990 Fla. Laws 1729, 1745. Given their narrow scope, the Florida surrogacy
provisions have not been analyzed in detail. Florida, in the same act, also amended
its general durable power statute to allow a principal to grant an agent health care
authority. See infra note 121.
117 Dean Areen notes that under most living will statutes, the directive becomes
operative only if the patient becomes terminally ill, that many living will forms fail to
make clear which forms of care may be foregone, and that "a living will, no matter
how detailed, cannot possibly anticipate the full range of difficult treatment decisions
that may have to be made." Areen, supra note 115, at 230. She concludes that the
durable power is "[an increasingly attractive choice." Id. Other disadvantages of a
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Durable power of attorney for health care statutes come in
several forms.118 The most common type of legislation includes a
statutory form directed exclusively at health care matters and
contains detailed requirements as to the form's execution and
implementation.11 9 Other approaches include adding health care
authority to a statutory short-form,1 20 amending general durable
power statutes to clarify that a principal may delegate health care
living will, not shared by the durable power for health care, include its inconsistency
with the doctrine of informed consent, its failure to take into account a change of
mind between the date of its execution and the time of its use, its prohibitions
against the withdrawing of certain forms of treatment, and its failure to respond to
persons who may want maximum care and treatment. See Francis J. Collin, Jr.,
Planning and Drafting Durable Powers of Attorney for Health Care, 22 INsT. EST.
PLAN. 500, 504.2 (1988).
118 Not included here are statutes that authorize the designation of an agent for
the purpose of implementing a living will or making a decision regarding the
provision of life-sustaining treatment. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 20-17-201(10)
(Michie 1991); DEL CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 2502(b) (1983); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 145B.06.2 (West Supp. 1992).
119 Statutory forms of health care powers have been enacted in California, the
District of Columbia, Georgia, Idaho, Iowa, Illinois, Kansas, Kentucky, Nevada, New
Hampshire, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oregon, Rhode Island, Texas,
Utah, Vermont, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. For a list of citations, see infra notes
124-30. For a detailed analysis of the statutory form durable power for health care,
see infra text accompanying notes 124-266.
Utah's statute varies significantly from the other statutes. Utah's special
power of attorney provision allows the principal to appoint an agent for the purpose
of executing a "directive" in the event the principal should incur an injury, disease, or
illness which renders the principal unable to give current directions to health care
providers. The power is effective upon the attending physician's certification of the
principal's inability to give current directions. UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-1106 (Supp.
1990). The "directive" to be executed is a signed agreement between the attending
physician and the agent that describes the principal's condition and specifies the care
or treatment to be provided or the care or treatment to be withheld. See id. § 75-2-
1105(4).
120 For a general discussion of the statutory short-form, see supra text
accompanying notes 51-79. For a discussion of the health care authority under the
Alaska, Connecticut, and New Mexico forms, see supra notes 66-68 and accompany-
ing text.
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authority to an agent,"' enacting family health care consent statutes
that name the agent as one of the permissible decisionmakers,1 22
and adopting statutes that prescribe detailed requirements as to the
power's execution and implementation but which do so without the
121 See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-14-501(1), -506 (West Supp. 1991)
(principal may grant agent authority to consent to medical care, counsel, treatment,
or service by certified professional or institution); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 709.08(1) (West
Supp. 1991) (power may authorize agent to arrange for and consent to medical,
therapeutical, and surgical procedures, including the administration of drugs); IND.
CODE ANN. §§ 30-5-5-16 to -17 (Burns Supp. 1992) (power may grant agent general
authority with respect to health care, including the authority to consent to or refuse
health care and, with express authorization, to withdraw or withhold health care);
LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 2997(A)(7) (West Supp. 1991) (power may authorize agent
to make health care decisions but may not authorize agent to make a declaration of
life-sustaining procedures); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 5-501 (West Supp.
1991) (principal may grant agent authority to consent to or withhold any medical or
other professional care for the principal, the health care power must be notarized
and the court, instead of the guardian, is given the authority to revoke or suspend
the agent's authority); 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5603(h) (Supp. 1991) (by including
statutorily prescribed phrases in the document, the principal incorporates detailed
statutory definitions into the power of attorney; phrases relating to health care are
a power "to authorize my admission to a medical, nursing, residential or similar
facility, and to enter into agreements for my care," and a power "to authorize
medical and surgical procedures"); S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-5-501(A) (Law. Co-op.
Supp. 1991) (principal may grant agent authority to consent or to withhold consent
to health care); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 59-7-2.1, -2.7 to -2.8 (Supp. 1992)
(principal may authorize agent to consent, to reject, or to withdraw consent for
medical procedures, treatment, or intervention, but in the absence of express
authority, severe restrictions are placed on the withholding or withdrawal of artificial
nutrition and hydration); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 11.94.010(3) (West Supp. 1992)
(principal may authorize agent to give informed consent, but the following persons
are disqualified from acting as agents unless the person is also a spouse, adult child,
or brother or sister of the principal: the principal's physician, the physician's
employees, and owners and employees of the health facility in which the principal
resides or receives care). New Mexico's provision also is codified as part of its
general durable power statute. For a description, see supra note 67.
122 Virginia's family consent statute provides that an agent under a durable
power may make a decision to provide, withdraw, or withhold treatment if the power
so authorizes, a licensed physician determines after personal examination that the
principal is incapable of making an informed decision, and the agent is not employed
by the physician or the organization employing the physician. VA. CODE ANN.
§ 37.1-134.4 (Michie Supp. 1991).
The UPC and the New Durable Powers 365
guidance of a statutory form of power. 23
Since 1988, the most commonly enacted type of legislation has
included a statutory form. The statutory form directed exclusively at
health care is a recent phenomenon; the first was enacted in
California in 1984.124 Despite its recent initiation, its growth has
been explosive. Forms were added in 1986 in Rhode Island,' 25
123 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 201D (West Supp. 1992); MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 700.496 (West Supp. 1992); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 41-41-151 to -183 (Supp.
1991); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 404.800-.865 (Vernon Supp. 1992); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§§ 26:2H-53 to -78 (West Supp. 1992)); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1337.11-.17
(Anderson Supp. 1991); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 34-6-201 to -215 (Supp. 1991); WYo.
STAT. §§ 3-5-101 to -213 (Supp. 1992). These statutes include all elements of a
comprehensive statutory form enactment except the power of attorney form itself.
Although they omit a standardized form of power, several of the statutes contain
related form requirements. Ohio requires that a statutory form of warning be
included with all commercially printed powers. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1337.17
(Anderson Supp. 1991). Tennessee requires that a detailed warning be included with
all powers that are not personally prepared by the principal. TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 34-6-205 (1991). In Mississippi, the warning must be included with all powers.
MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-41-163 (Supp. 1991). Mississippi and Tennessee also
prescribe a form for witnessing or acknowledgment. MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-41-
159(1)(b) (Supp. 1991); TENN. CODE ANN. § 34-6-203(a)(3) (1991). Michigan
prescribes a form for the agent's acceptance of office. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 700.496(7) (West Supp. 1992).
The innovative New Jersey statute is the first to authorize the creation of both
living wills ("instruction directives") and durable powers of attorney for health care
("proxy directives"). Furthermore, a declarant may combine an instruction directive
and a proxy directive into one document. However, no statutory form is provided.
See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 26:2H-53 to -78 (West Supp. 1992).
124 Keene Health Care Agent Act, ch. 312, § 8, 1984 Cal. Stat. 1554, 1558-67
(codified as amended at CAL CIV. CODE §§ 2500-2508 (West Supp. 1992)). The
statutory form enactment follows by one year the enactment of a separate statute
governing the creation of a durable power of attorney for health care, the scope of
authority that may be granted, methods of revocation, and the immunities of health
care providers. See Act filed Sept. 29, 1983, ch. 1204, § 10, 1983 Cal. Stat. 4610,
4615-22 (codified as amended at CAL CIV. CODE §§ 2430-2443 (West Supp. 1992)).
12 Act approved June 24, 1986, ch. 190, 1986 R.I. Pub. Laws 274 (codified as
amended at R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 23-4.10-1 to -2 (1989)).
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followed by Illinois and Nevada in 1987,126 the District of Columbia,
Idaho, and Vermont in 1988,127 Kansas, Oregon, and Texas in
1989,128 Georgia, Kentucky, New York, West Virginia, and Wiscon-
sin in 1990,129 and Iowa, New Hampshire, North Carolina and
North Dakota in 1991.130
Unlike the statutory short-forms directed exclusively or primarily
at property matters, the durable power for health care forms are
126 Powers of Attorney for Health Care Law, Pub. Act 85-701, Art. IV, 1987 Ill.
Laws 2930, 2940-48 (codified as amended at ILL ANN. STAT. ch. 1 10Y2, paras. 804-1
to -12 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1992)); Act approved June 11, 1987, ch. 396, 1987 Nev.
Stat. 913 (codified as amended at NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 449.800-.860 (Michie
1991)).
127 Health Care Decisions Act of 1988, D.C. Law 7-189, 35 D.C. Reg. 8653
(codified as amended at D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 21-2201 to -2213 (1989 & Supp. 1992));
Act approved Mar. 30, 1988, ch. 262, § 5, 1988 Idaho Sess. Laws 508, 511-15
(codified at IDAHO CODE § 39-4505 (Supp. 1992)); Act approved May 24, 1988, Pub.
Act 223, 1988 Vt. Laws 285 (codified as amended at VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, §§ 3451-
3467 (1989 & Supp. 1991)).
128 Act approved Apr. 25, 1989, ch. 181, 1989 Kan. Sess. Laws 1202 (codified at
KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 58-625 to -632 (Supp. 1991)); Act approved. Aug. 2,1989, ch.
914, 1989 Or. Laws 1748 (codified as amended at OR. REV. STAT. §§ 127.505-.585
(1991)); Act effective June 14, 1989, ch. 491, 1989 Tex. Gen. Laws 1669 (codified as
amended at TEx. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 135.001-.018 (West Supp.
1992)).
129 Durable Power of Attorney for Health Care Act, Act 1259, 1990 Ga. Laws
1101 (codified at GA. CODE ANN. §§ 31-36-1 to -13 (Michie 1991)); Health Care
Surrogate Act of Kentucky, ch. 123, 1990 Ky. Acts 265 (codified at KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 311.970-.986 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1990)); Act approved July 22,
1990, ch. 752, 1990 N.Y. Laws 3547 (codified as amended at N.Y. PUB. HEALTH
LAW §§ 2980-2994 (McKinney Supp. 1992)); Medical Power of Attorney Act, ch. 97,
1990 W. Va. Acts 785 (codified at W. VA. CODE §§ 16-30A-1 to -20 (1991)); Act of
Apr. 12,1990, Act 200, § 8, 1989 Wis. Laws 1160, 1161-68 (codified as amended at
WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 155.01-.80 (West Supp. 1992)).
130 Act effective May 8, 1991, ch. 140, 1991 Iowa Acts 188 (codified at IOWA
CODE ANN. §§ 144B.1 to -.12 (West Supp. 1992)); Act effective July 19, 1991, ch.
146, 1991 N.H. Laws 196 (codified at N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 137-J:1 to -J:16
(Supp. 1991)); Act effective Oct. 1, 1991, ch. 639, § 1, 1991 N.C. Sess. Laws 1470,
1470-80 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 32A-15 to -26 (1991)); Act approved Apr.
16, 1991, ch. 266, 1991 N.D. Laws 716 (codified at N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 23-06.5-01
to -18 (1991)).
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anything but short and simple. Their execution requirements are
formidable.13 1 Worse yet, because requirements vary, the effective-
ness of the form is substantially diminished for individuals who may
move from state to state. t32 Furthermore, many of the forms force
principals to spell out their intent with exactitude. If the form is
filled out correctly, maximum protection of the principal's intent is
assured, but if the principal errs, the agent might not implement
decisions that the principal would have made.133 Finally, several of
the statutes, following the lead of the living will acts, make it difficult
for an agent to authorize withholding or withdrawing of life-sustaining
treatment.13
Given the numerous competing interests, there may be no
satisfactory answers to the dilemmas created by the statutory form
health care enactments.'35 Perhaps the best that can be done here
is to lay out the critical elements of the forms and statutes, so that
practitioners may at least have a guide through the shoals.
131 For a discussion of the execution requirements, see infra text accompanying
notes 136-73.
132 The problem of nonconforming forms is discussed infra text accompanying
notes 255-66.
133 This problem can cut both ways. It is most acute in the provisions dealing
with the withholding or withdrawing of life-sustaining treatment. The Illinois form,
for example, permits the agent to withhold or withdraw all forms of life-sustaining
treatment, including artificial nutrition and hydration, except to the extent that the
principal has otherwise specified. ILL ANN. STAT. ch. 110 1/2, para. 804-10 (Smith-
Hurd Supp. 1992). The Oregon form and statute, on the other hand, prohibit the
agent from withholding or withdrawing life-sustaining treatment unless the principal
checks the appropriate lines or has otherwise made his or her wishes known. OR.
REV. STAT. § 127.530 (1991) (form); id. § 127.540(b), -.580(1) (statute).
134 See infra text accompanying notes 245-52.
13S The conflict is sharpest over the issue of withdrawing or withholding life-
sustaining treatment. The competing players include attorneys who draft the
pertinent documents and who are called upon by their clients for counsel on the
various available options, health care providers who are called upon to implement
those decisions, and individuals and groups who, out of deeply held moral or
religious beliefs, feel compelled to make their views known.
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B. The Statutory Form Health-Care Power
1. Execution Requirements
General durable power of attorney statutes typically prescribe
few or no execution requirements. 36 The statutory form health
care enactments, in contrast, have been influenced by their statutory
short-form siblings, all of which require acknowledgment, 137 or by
their living-will cousins, which require witnessing."m Illinois is the
only state with no execution requirements.1 39  The other states
require either that the power be signed by two witnesses,1 40 that it
136 See, e.g., UNIF. DURABLE POWER OF ATTORNEY AcT, 8A U.L.A. 275 (1983)
(no execution requirements).
137 See UNIF. STATUTORY FORM POWER OF ATrORNEY AT § 1, 8A U.L.A.
329-31 (Supp. 1992) (acknowledgment required); ALASKA STAT. § 13.26.332 (Supp.
1991) (acknowledgment required); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 143(a) (West Supp.
1992) (acknowledgment in same manner as deed required); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110
1/2, para. 803-3 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1992) (acknowledgment required); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 523.23 (West 1990) (acknowledgment required); NEB. REV. STAT. § 49-1522
(1988) (acknowledgment required); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 45-5-501(B) (Michie 1989)
(acknowledgments by both principal and agent required); N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW §
5-1501(1) (McKinney 1989) (acknowledgment in same manner as deed required);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 32A-1 (1991) (acknowledgment required).
138 Professor Gelfand, in his comprehensive survey of living will legislation, notes
that all of the statutes require that a living will be witnessed by at least two persons.
Gregory Gelfand, Living Will Statutes: The First Decade, 1987 Wis. L. REV. 737, 755-
56.
139 The Illinois statutory form provides for the signature of one witness, but the
omission of the witness does not invalidate the power. Illinois specifically provides
that a power of attorney need not be witnessed nor conform in any respect to the
statutory form. ILL ANN. STAT. ch. 110 1/2, para. 804-05 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1990).
For a detailed discussion of the Illinois statute, see Zartman, supra note 59.
140 D.C. CODE ANN. § 21-2205(c) (1989); GA. CODE ANN. § 31-36-5(a) (Michie
1990); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 137-J:5 (Supp. 1991); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW
§ 2981(2) (McKinney Supp. 1992); N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-06.5-05 (1991); OR. REV.
STAT. § 127.515(1)(b) (1991); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-4.10-2 (1989); TEX. CIV. PRAC.
& REM. CODE ANN. § 135.004 (West Supp. 1992); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 3456
(1989); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 155.10(1)(c) (West Supp. 1991).
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be witnessed or acknowledged at the principal's option, 4' or that it
be both witnessed and acknowledged. 142
Just like for living wills, 1 43 or regular wills for that matter, the
statutory form health care enactments prohibit certain individuals
from acting as witnesses.1" The most prevalent prohibition per-
tains to relatives and those with a financial interest in the principal's
estate. Nine jurisdictions disqualify relatives by blood, marriage, or
adoption; 145 one disqualifies relatives by blood or marriage; 146 one
disqualifies the spouse and relatives by blood or adoption, 147 one
disqualifies relatives of the principal and the principal's spouse,1 48
and three disqualify the spouse and presumptive heirs. 149  In
141 IDAHO CODE § 39-4505 (Supp. 1992); IOWA CODE ANN. § 144B.3(l)(b)
(West Supp. 1992); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58-629(e) (Supp. 1991); KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 311.974(1) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1990); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §
449.840(1) (Michie 1991). California's optional statutory form must be witnessed.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 2500 (West Supp. 1991). The statute, however, permits a durable
power for health care to be either witnessed or acknowledged. CAL CIV. CODE §
2432(a)(3) (West Supp. 1991).
142 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 32A-16(3) (1991); W. VA. CODE § 16-30A-6(a) (Supp.
1990).
143 The witness eligibility rules for living wills are described in detail in Gelfand,
supra note 138, at 757-58.
144 Georgia is the exception. It requires witnesses but does not impose eligibility
requirements. GA. CODE ANN. § 31-36-5(a) (Michie 1991). In addition, although
Kentucky and New York have witness eligibility requirements, their requirements are
quite limited in scope. For the Kentucky requirements, see infra note 155 and
accompanying text. For the New York requirements, see infra notes 153, 158 and
accompanying text.
145 CAL CIV. CODE § 2432(e)(1) (West Supp. 1991); D.C. CODE ANN. § 21-
2205(d) (1989); IDAHO CODE § 39-4505 (Supp. 1992); IOWA CODE ANN. § 144B.3(3)
(West Supp. 1992); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58-629(e)(1) (Supp. 1991); NEV. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 449.840(3)(a) (Michie 1991); OR. REV. STAT. § 127.515(3)(a)(A) (1991); R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 23-4.10-2 (1989); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 155.10(2)(a) (West Supp. 1990).
146 W. VA. CODE § 16-30A-6(b)(2) (1991).
147 N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-06.5-05 (1991).
148 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 32A-16(6) (1991).
149 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 137-J:5 (Supp. 1991); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.
CODE ANN. § 135.004(b)(3) (West Supp. 1992); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 3456
(1989). The disqualification of both the spouse and heirs is not necessarily
redundant. In Vermont, for example, the spouse is not entitled to an intestate share
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addition, most of the states disqualify persons entitled to take under
the principal's current will1 5 and several states extend the prohibi-
tion to beneficiaries under inter vivos deeds. 5 1
Several jurisdictions have only a partial prohibition against
family members and estate beneficiaries serving as witnesses. The
power is valid if only one and not both of the witnesses is so disquali-
fied. 152 In nearly all jurisdictions, however, a power is invalid if
even one witness is from one of the other ineligible classes. Those
classes include the agent,15 3 health care providers and employees
unless the decedent is not survived by issue. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 551 (1989).
150 CAL. CIV. CODE § 2432(e)(2) (West Supp. 1991) (will or codicil then existing
or by operation of law); D.C. CODE ANN. § 21-2205(d) (1989) (current will or by
operation of law); IDAHO CODE § 39-4505 (Supp. 1992) (will then existing or by
operation of law); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58-629(e)(1) (Supp. 1991) (laws of intestate
succession of the state or under any will or codicil of the principal); NEV. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 449.840(3)(b) (Michie 1991) (persons entitled to any part of the estate of the
principal); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 32A-16(6) (1991) (existing will or codicil or by
intestacy); OR. REV. STAT. § 127.515(3)(a)(B) (1991) (person who at the time of
execution would be entitled to any portion of the estate under will or by operation
of law); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-4.10-2 (1989) (will then existing or by operation of
law); W. VA. CODE § 16-30A-6(b)(3) (1991) (laws of intestate succession of
principal's domicile or under any will or codicil); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 155.10(2)(b)
(West Supp. 1991) (person entitled to any portion of the estate).
151 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 137-:5 (Supp. 1991) (will, trust or other
testamentary instrument or deed in existence or by operation of law); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 23-06.5-05 (1991) (will or deed in existence or by operation of law); TEx.
CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 135.004(b)(4) (West Supp. 1992) (will or deed in
existence or by operation of law); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 3456 (1989) (will or deed
in existence or by operation of law).
152 CAL. CIv. CODE § 2432(e) (West Supp. 1991); D.C. CODE ANN. § 21-
2205(d) (1989); IDAHO CODE § 39-4505 (Supp. 1992); IOWA CODE ANN. § 144B.3(3)
(West Supp. 1992); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 449.840(3) (Michie 1991); OR. REV.
STAT. § 127.515(3)(a) (1991); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-4.10-2 (1989).
153 CAL CiV. CODE § 2432(d)(3) (West Supp. 1991); IDAHO CODE § 39-4505
(Supp. 1992); IOWA CODE ANN. § 144B.3(2)(c) (West Supp. 1992); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 58-629(e)(1) (Supp. 1991); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 449.840(2)(e) (Michie 1991);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 137-4:5 (Supp. 1991); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW§ 2981(2)(a)
(McKinney Supp. 1992); N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-06.5-05 (1991); OR. REV. STAT. §
127.515(3)(b)(A) (1991); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-4.10-2 (1989); TEx. CIv. PRAC. &
REM. CODE ANN. § 135.004(b)(1) (West Supp. 1992); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 3456
(1989); W. VA. CODE § 16-30A-6(b)(6) (1991); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 155.10(2)(e)
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and, to a lesser extent, nursing home operators and employees. 5 4
Several states, however, allow providers and operators who are not
currently treating the principal to serve as witnesses.'
Concern over abuse of nursing home patients extends beyond
the disqualification of nursing home operators and employees.
California, for example, requires that its state advocate for the
elderly act as one of the witnesses if the power is executed while the
principal is a resident of a skilled nursing home. 1 6  Georgia
(West Supp. 1991).
'54 CAL CIV. CODE § 2432(d) (West Supp. 1991) (health care providers and
employees; operators and employees of community care and residential care facilities
for the elderly); IDAHO CODE § 39-4505 (Supp. 1992) (health care providers and
employees; operators and employees of community care facilities); NEV. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 449.840(2) (Michie 1991) (health care providers and employees; operators
and employees of health care facilities); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-4.10-2 (1989) (health
care providers and employees; operators and employees of community care
facilities). See infra note 155 for the other statutory provisions.
155 D.C. CODE ANN. § 21-2205(c) (1989) (health care providers of principal and
employees thereof); IOWA CODE ANN. § 144B.3(2) (West Supp. 1992) (health care
provider or employee of a health care provider attending the principal); KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 311.972(3), -.974(1) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1991) (employees,
owners, directors, or officers of health care facility in which principal is a resident or
patient unless related within the fourth degree by blood or marriage); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 32A-16(6) (1991) (attending physician and employees; employees of health
care facility, nursing home, or group care home in which principal resides or is a
patient); N.D. CENT. CODE § 23.06.5-05 (1991) (principal's health or long-term care
services provider or provider's employees); OR. REV. STAT. § 127.515(3)(b)(B)
(1991) (attending physician); TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 135.004(b)(2)
(West Supp. 1992) (principal's health or residential care providers and their
employees); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 3456 (1989) (same); W. VA. CODE § 16-30A-
6(b)(5) (1991) (attending physician); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 155.10(2)(d) (West Supp.
1991) (principal's health care providers). New Hampshire allows the principal's
health or residential care providers or employees to act as one, but not as both, of
the witnesses. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1374:5 (Supp. 1991).
156 CAL CIV. CODE § 2432(f) (West Supp. 1991). The intent of this require-
ment is "to recognize that some patients in skilled nursing facilities are insulated
from a voluntary decisionmaking role, by virtue of the custodial nature of their care,
so as to require special assurance that they are capable of willfully and voluntarily
executing a durable power of attorney for health care." Id.
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requires the attending physician to act as a third witness in such
cases,157 and New York has enacted an intricate set of special
witness rules."5 " North Dakota and Vermont, in what is perhaps a
more effective move, require that the power be explained to the
patient.15 9
Before lining up witnesses, however, the principal must take
care to select the correct form. The Oregon and Rhode Island
statutory forms are mandatory and no substitutes are permitted.16
Idaho's statutory form is technically optional, but because a substitute
form must include all of the elements of the statutory form, it is in
essence mandatory.16' Several of the other statutes also permit
substitutes, but they are subject to a limited and ambiguous "substan-
tial equivalence" test. 162  The current trend, however, is to allow
157 The attending physician must act as a third witness if the principal is a
patient in a hospital or skilled nursing facility. GA. CODE ANN. § 31-36-5(a) (Michie
1991).
158 The New York rules are not directed at nursing home patients per se, but
are directed at patients who are residents at state facilities or at other mental health
and developmental disability facilities. At least one of the two required witnesses
cannot be an employee of the facility. In addition, for a patient at a mental health
facility, one of the witnesses must be a psychiatrist. For a patient at a developmental
disability facility, one of the witnesses must be a physician or clinical psychologist.
See N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW § 2981(2) (McKinney Supp. 1992).
159 N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-06.5-10(2) (1991); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 3460(b)
(1989). This requirement is, in a number of respects, more effective than the other
provisions, which merely address signing requirements. Both North Dakota and
Vermont require that the nature and effect of the power be explained to the patient.
A statement certifying that the explanation has been made must then be signed. Just
as importantly, the explanation may be made by a person with whom the patient may
enjoy a close personal relationship, including the patient's attorney or clergy.
160 OR. REV. STAT. § 127.530 (1991) ("A written power of attorney for health
care ... shall be in the following form"); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 234.10-1 (1989) ("The
statutory form ... shall be the only form by which a person may execute a durable
power of attorney for health care").
161 IDAHO CODE § 39-4505 (Supp. 1992) ("A durable power of attorney for
health care may be in the following form, or in any other form which contains the
elements set forth in the following form.").
162 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58-632 (Supp. 1991) ("substantially the following form");
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 449.830 (Michie 1991) ("[Tlhe form ... must be
substantially as follows"); N.H REV. STAT. ANN. § 1374:15 (Supp. 1991) ("The
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optional forms.1 63
After securing the correct form and verifying the witness's
credentials, the principal must review the procedures for execution,
a ritual that in several jurisdictions is modeled after the Statute of
Wills.' The principal will also need to check for additional
execution requirements that are not widely shared but which apply in
durable power of attorney shall be in substantially the following form"); TEX. Civ.
PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 135.016 (West Supp. 1992) ("substantially the following
form"); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 3466 (1989) (same); W. VA. CODE § 16-30A-18
(1991) ("the following form or in such form which substantially complies with the
requirements set forth herein").
163 Prior to the 1990 enactments, only California, the District of Columbia, and
Illinois included optional forms. See CAL CIV. CODE § 2507 (West Supp. 1991);
D.C. CODE ANN. § 21-2207 (1989); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110 1/2, para. 804-10(a)
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1992). Optional forms are, however, provided in three of the five
1990 enactments, see GA. CODE ANN. § 31-36-10(a) (Michie 1991); KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 311.974(2) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1990); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW
§ 2981(5)(d) (McKinney Supp. 1992); and in three of the four 1991 enactments, see
IOWA CODE ANN. § 144B.5 (West Supp. 1992); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 32A-25 (1991);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-06.5-15 (1991). Although the forms are optional, the drafter
of an optional form should pay careful attention to matters such as the execution
requirements and restrictions on agent eligibility. Wisconsin takes a slightly different
approach. Use of its statutory form is required unless the instrument contains a
prescribed form of disclosure statement or was prepared under the supervision of an
attorney. See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 155.30 (West Supp. 1992).
164 Some of the requirements include: a statement by the principal that the
principal is aware of the nature of the document and is signing the document freely
and voluntarily, see, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 3466 (1989); a request by the
principal that the witnesses serve as witnesses, see, e.g., TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.
CODE ANN. § 135.004(c)(3) (West Supp. 1992), a requirement that the witnesses sign
in the presence of each other and in the presence of the principal, see, e.g., IOWA
CODE ANN. § 144B.3(1)(b)(1) (West Supp. 1992); and an affirmation by the
witnesses that the principal appeared to be of sound mind and free from duress, see,
e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 137J:5 (Supp. 1991). All of these requirements, which
must be recited in the attestation clause to the power, are adapted from the law of
wills. Under the law of wills, at least, a failure to comply can lead to disastrous
results. See In re Taylor's Estate, 165 N.W. 1079 (S.D. 1917) (will invalid due to
failure of witness to read attestation clause, witness's lack of personal knowledge of
testator, and failure of testator to declare the nature of the document and to request
that witnesses serve as witnesses).
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the principal's jurisdiction.lss
The requirement that the form be copied or substantially copied
from the statute may help to ensure that the principal has considered
all questions raised in the form and has read the detailed explanation
or warning that is usually included.166 It may also assist in reducing
possible reluctance to honor durable powers for health care.1 67
Yet, this requirement stifles creativity. Given the increasing sophisti-
cation of attorney-prepared durable powers, one wonders whether
16s For example, Oregon provides that a power automatically expires seven
years after the date of its execution. OR. REV. STAT. § 127.530 (1991); id.
§ 127.515(1)(b) (date required). The seven-year limit protects principals who may
have a change of heart between the date of execution and the date of need. On the
other hand, a less than vigilant principal may end up with no power at all.
Some of the other miscellaneous execution requirements include: disqualifica-
tion of creditors as witnesses, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 32A-16(6) (1991); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 23-06.5-05 (1991); TEx. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 135.004(b)(5)
(West Supp. 1992); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 3456 (1989); WIS. STAT. ANN.
§ 155.10(2)(b) (West Supp. 1991); disqualification as witnesses of persons who are
financially responsible for the principal's care, KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58-629(e)(1)
(Supp. 1991); W. VA. CODE § 16-30A-6(b)(4) (1991); WIS. STAT. ANN.
§ 155.10(2)(c) (West Supp. 1991); and a requirement that the agent sign an
acceptance of appointment, N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-06.5-06 (1991); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 127.525 (1991).
166 For example, the Oregon warning, which is entitled just that, starts off: "This
is an important legal document. It creates a power of attorney for health care.
Before signing this document, you should know these important facts .. " OR. REV.
STAT. § 127.530 (1991). It continues by delineating the authority and duties of the
agent, the execution requirements, the duration of the power, and the principal's
right of revocation. Id. It concludes by suggesting that an attorney be consulted if
questions arise. Id.
167 The declared purpose of the Illinois Powers of Attorney for Health Care
Law, among other things, is to provide a statutory form so that "health care providers
and other third parties who rely in good faith on the acts and decisions of the agent
within the scope of the power may do so without fear of civil or criminal liability to
the principal, the State or any other person." ILL ANN. STAT. ch. 110 1/2, para. 804-
1 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1992). A similar statement is included in the Georgia statute.
See GA. CODE ANN. § 31-36-2(c) (Michie 1991). Despite the declared purpose of
their statutes, however, both Georgia and Illinois made their statutory forms entirely
optional. See id. § 31-36-10(a); ILL ANN. STAT. ch. 110 1/2, para. 804-10(a) (Smith-
Hurd Supp. 1992).
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the rigid form requirements provide much advantage.1t
The witnessing and ceremonial requirements may impress the
principal with the seriousness of the document 69 and provide some
assurance that the principal has capacity at the time of execution.170
If one draws an analogy to the law of wills, the requirements also
may have been designed to limit the use of informal documents and
statements not made with the requisite intent, to allow the principal
some independence of thought, and to prevent the use of witnesses
who might be placed in a conflict of interest. 7 1
168 For an example of a sophisticated attorney-prepared durable power for
health care, see Collin, supra note 117, 505.5 (analysis of a sample form). Quality
forms are not limited to private attorneys. The California Medical Association, for
example, has produced a form that is far more comprehensive than its statutory
counterpart. Compare the form in CAL CIV. CODE § 2500 (West. Supp. 1991) with
CAL MED. ASS'N, Durable Power of Attorney for Health Care, reprinted in Collin,
supra note 117, 509. See also A.B.A. COMM'N ON LEGAL PROBLEMS OF THE
ELDERLY, HEALTH CARE POWERS OF ATTORNEY: AN INTRODUCTION AND SAMPLE
FORM (1990); FRANCIS J. COLLIN, JR. ET AL, DRAFTING THE DURABLE POWER OF
ATTORNEY: A SYSTEMS APPROACH (Albert L. Moses & John J. Lombard, Jr. eds.,
2d ed. 1992).
169 The President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine
and Biomedical and Behavioral Research, in its ground-breaking study, Making
Health Care Decisions, concurred with the view that a patient, in executing a durable
power or living will, should give due regard to the step being taken. The President's
Commission concluded, however, that the best way to accomplish this objective is not
by ceremony or ritual, but by requiring the health care provider to explain the
document's probable consequences. See 1 PRESIDENT'S COMM'N FOR THE STUDY OF
ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH,
MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS 160-61 (1982) [hereinafter PRESIDENT'S
COMM'N].
170 The President's Commission noted, "[tihere should be some way to establish
that a person filling out a directive (the principal) was legally competent to do so at
the time." PRESIDENT'S COMM'N, supra note 169, at 160. The American College of
Probate Counsel (now the American College of Trust and Estate Counsel) has
opined that this objective can best be accomplished by requiring witnesses and an
attestation clause. The College, however, saw no need for witness eligibility rules.
See Report of the State Laws Committee on the Use of Durable Powers of Attorney for
Health Care Decisions, 15 PROB. NOTES 89, 90 (1989).
171 The purposes of the execution requirements for an ordinary attested will are
to make certain that the testator's statements were made with the requisite intent, to
increase the reliability of the proof, and, by requiring that the witnesses be
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Those objectives are at least partially misplaced. Although a
family member may not witness, a family member is the one most
likely to be called upon to act as agent, a position in which the
potential for conflict of interest is even greater. 72  Moreover, by
making the power more difficult to execute, the requirements inhibit
rather than facilitate the use of the durable power device, thereby
placing more individuals in the uncertainty that the durable power
device is supposed to prevent. 7 3
2. Revocation
A primary goal of a revocation provision is to carry out the
principal's intent. Consequently, one might assume that revocation
should be permitted by any means, formal or informal, through which
the principal makes known this intent. On the other hand, ease of
revocation increases the risk of inadvertent revocation. Thus, some
degree of formality may be beneficial to forestall questions regarding
the reliability of proof and the finality of the principal's decision. 74
disinterested, to guard the testator against undue influence and other forms of
imposition. See Ashbel G. Gulliver & Catherine J. Tilson, Classification of Gratuitous
Transfers, 51 YALE LJ. 1, 3-13 (1941).
172 "Every recent survey that we have found indicates that society believes that
a patient's family members should function as his or her surrogate decisionmakers."
In re Jobes, 529 A.2d 434, 446 n.ll (NJ. 1987) (citing surveys with family preference
ratings of from 64% to 84%). The potential conflict of interest of placing a family
member in a decisionmaking role has not gone unnoticed, however. See, e.g., John
F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp. v. Bludworth, 432 So. 2d 611, 618 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1983), rev'd on other grounds, 452 So. 2d 921 (Fla. 1984): "One need not go so far
back in history as Cain and Abel to recognize that the interests of various family
members are not always synonymous nor even harmonious. The newspaper is a
daily reminder that murderers are often related to their victims."
173 In the absence of an effective designation of an agent, the health care
provider may insist on court approval, request that a guardian be appointed, or look
to the family, either as a matter of custom or, on occasion, with case law or statutory
support. For a discussion of the various options, see MEISEL, supra note 7, §§ 8.14-
.32.
174 For a complete discussion of some of these arguments within the context of
living wills, see Leslie Pickering Francis, The Evanescence of Living Wills, 24 REAL
PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 141,152-55, 160-64 (1989); Gelfand, supra note 138, at 765-68.
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The arguments supporting heightened formalities have not been
followed. Statutory form durable powers for health care may be hard
to execute, but they are easy to revoke. That ease of revocation has
become the norm should not be surprising. Ease of revocation is one
of the staples of the law of agency."' Furthermore, ease of revoca-
tion is common among the living will statutes, from which much of
the wording in the health care statutes is patterned. 176
All of the statutes, of course, either expressly or impliedly
permit revocation by subsequent writing, including execution of a
subsequent power. 177  Oral revocations are authorized,'178 and a
substantial minority of the statutes apparently permit revocation by
behavior that manifests an intent to revoke,179 including, in several
Professor Gelfand is particularly concerned about the abuse of informal statements.
He notes the following:
Physicians faced with reports of oral statements that may or may
not be revocations cannot say for certain whether the statements
were actually made, whether the words used were a sufficiently
clear expression of an intent to revoke, or whether clearly stated
words were intended as the patient's final expression.
Id. at 768.
17s An agency is revoked by written or spoken words or other conduct which,
reasonably interpreted, indicate that the principal no longer consents to have the
agent act. An agreement that the authority be revoked only in a particular manner
is ineffective. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 119 cmt. a (1957).
176 Professor Gelfand notes that of 39 living will statutes surveyed, 10 permit
revocation by any means that communicates the necessary intent, and 24 others
specifically permit revocation by oral statement. Gelfand, supra note 138, at 767 &
nn.116-17.
177 Only Georgia and Illinois do not specifically provide that execution of a
subsequent power revokes an earlier power. A subsequent power, however, would
most likely be deemed an amendment that totally supersedes the earlier power.
Georgia and Illinois, unlike the other jurisdictions, specifically provide that a
principal may amend a power. See GA. CODE ANN. § 31-36-6(d) (Michie 1991); ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 1101/2, para. 804-6(b) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1992).
178 The only exceptions are Idaho, Kansas, and North Carolina. They do not
necessarily prohibit oral revocation. They simply fail to mention it as an option.
179 GA. CODE ANN. § 31-36-6(a)(3) (Michie 1991) (oral or any other expression
of intent to revoke the agency); ILL ANN. STAT. ch. 110 /, para. 804-6(a)(3) (Smith-
Hurd Supp. 1992) (same); IOWA CODE ANN. § 144B.8(1) (West Supp. 1992) (any
manner by which the principal is able to communicate the intent to revoke); N.H.
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cases, the traditional revocation by physical destruction. 10  In
addition, a substantial minority of the statutes waive, at least in part,
the requirement of capacity. The most aggressive provide that the
principal may revoke a power regardless of his or her mental
state. 18' Moderate statutes provide that the principal's capacity is
REV. STAT. ANN. § 137J:6(I)(a) (Supp. 1991) (oral or written notification, or by any
other act evidencing a specific intent to revoke); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW
§ 2985(1)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1991) (orally or in writing or by any other act
evidencing a specific intent to revoke the proxy); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 32A-20(b)
(1991) (any manner by which the principal is able to communicate an intent to
revoke); N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-06.5-07 (1991) (orally, or in writing, or by any other
act evidencing a specific intent to revoke); OR. REV. STAT. § 127.545(1) (1991) (any
manner in which the principal is able to communicate the intent to revoke); TEX.
CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 135.005(a)(1) (West Supp. 1992) (oral or written
notification, or by any other act evidencing a specific intent to revoke); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 14, § 3457(a)(1) (1989) (orally, or in writing, or by any other act evidencing
a specific intent to revoke). The same result should be reached in the other jurisdic-
tions, assuming that general agency principles supplement their statutes. Under
agency law, a power may be revoked by conduct that is inconsistent with the
continuation of the agent's authority. See supra note 175.
180 GA. CODE ANN. § 31-36-6(a)(1) (Michie 1991) (by being obliterated, burned,
torn, or otherwise destroyed or defaced in a manner indicating intention to revoke);
ILL ANN. STAT. ch. 110 1/2, para. 804-6(a)(1) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1992) (similar);
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.976 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1991) (by destruction
of the document); W. VA. CODE § 16-30A-13(a) (1991) (by destruction thereof);
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 155.40(1)(a) (West Supp. 1991) (canceling, defacing, obliterating,
burning, tearing, or other destruction). Cf UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-507, 8 U.L.A.
122 (1983) (will or any part thereof is revoked by burning, tearing, canceling,
obliterating, or other destruction made with revocatory intent). For a detailed
discussion of the various forms of annihilation, see WILLIAM J. BOWE & DOUGLAS
H. PARKER, PAGE ON THE LAW OF WILLS §§ 21.4-.15 (1960 & Supp. 1990).
Professor Gelfand has determined that 24 of the living will statutes provide for
revocation by physical destruction. Gelfand, supra note 138, at 767 & n.117.
181 See GA. CODE ANN. § 31-36-6(a) (Michie 1991) (without regard to
principal's mental or physical condition); ILL- ANN. STAT. ch. 110Y2, para. 804-6(a)
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1992) (same); OR. REV. STAT. § 127.545(1) (1991) (same); Tax.
CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 135.005(a)(1) (West Supp. 1992) (without regard
to principal's mental state, competency, or capacity to make health care decisions).
Twenty-three of the living will statutes also allow revocation without regard to the
declarant's mental state or capacity. Gelfand, supra note 138, at 766 n.1 13.
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presumed. 18 2 Several others, by their silence, also may have waived
the capacity requirement. 183 Finally, many of the statutes protect
a provider acting in good faith without actual knowledge of a revocation.18 4
Safeguards have not been forgotten, however. An oral or
written revocation usually is not effective until delivered or communi-
182 See CAL. CIV. CODE § 2437(c) (West Supp. 1991) (adds that presumption
affects the burden of proof); D.C. CODE ANN. § 21-2208(c) (1989) (similar addition);
N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2985(1)(b) (McKinney Supp. 1991). Iowa employs both
standards. A principal may revoke a power without regard to physical or mental
condition and a principal's capacity to revoke is presumed. See IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 144B.8 (West Supp. 1992).
183 Only Kentucky and North Carolina explicitly require that a principal have
capacity in order to revoke a power. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.976
(Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1990) (grantor must have decisional capacity); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 32A-20(b) (1991) (principal must be capable of making and
communicating health care decision).
184 See CAL CIV. CODE § 2437 (f) (West Supp. 1991); GA. CODE ANN. § 31-36-
8(5) (Michie 1991); IOWA CODE ANN. § 144B.8(4) (West Supp. 1992); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 58-628 (Supp. 1991); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 32A-24(a) (1991); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 127.545(6) (1991); TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 135.010(c)(2) (West
Supp. 1992); W. VA. CODE §§ 16-30A-9, -10(a) (1991) (if agent presents affidavit of
nonrevocation); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 155.50(1)(c) (West Supp. 1991).
The protection of a provider who proceeds without actual knowledge of a
revocation is part of a broader system designed to encourage an agent to use the
delegated authority and to encourage compliance on the part of health care
providers. For example, an agent is protected in a number of jurisdictions for
actions taken or health care decisions made in good faith. See GA. CODE ANN.
§ 31-36-8(4) (Michie 1991); ILL ANN. STAT. ch. 110V2, para. 804-8(d) (Smith-Hurd
Supp. 1992); IOWA CODE ANN. § 144B.9(3) (West Supp. 1992); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 137-J:11(I) (Supp. 1991); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2986(2) (McKinney
Supp. 1991); N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-06.5-12(1) (1991); OR. REV. STAT. § 127.555(2)
(1991); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 135.010(a) (West Supp. 1992); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 3462(a) (1989); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 155.50(3) (West Supp.
1991). Furthermore, a majority of the statutes protect a health care provider for
good faith reliance on an agent's directions. See CAL CIV. CODE § 2438(a) (West
Supp. 1991); GA. CODE ANN. § 31-36-8 (Michie Supp. 1990); ILL ANN. STAT ch.
1101/2, para. 804-8 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1990); IOWA CODE ANN. § 144B.9(1) (West
Supp. 1992); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 137-J:11(II) (Supp. 1991); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH
LAW § 2986(1) (McKinney Supp. 1991); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 32A-24(b) (1991); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 23-06.5-12(2) (1991); OR. REV. STAT. § 127.555(3) (1991); TEX. Civ.
PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 135.010(b) (West Supp. 1992); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14,
§ 3462(b) (1989); W. VA. CODE § 16-30A-10(a) (1991).
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cated to the agent or health care provider, although sometimes
delivery is required only if the objective is to revoke a particular
agent's designation or authority, not to revoke the power itself.185
In addition, several statutes require that a witness reduce an oral
revocation to writing1 or, in the alternative, that an oral revoca-
tion be witnessed by two persons.187 Furthermore, to effectuate a
principal's presumed intent, a substantial majority of the statutes
provide that the designation of the principal's spouse as agent will be
revoked by divorce.18
185 See CAL CIV. CODE § 2437(a) (West Supp. 1991) (revocation of agent's
appointment upon oral or written notice to agent; revocation of agent's authority
upon oral or written notice to health care provider); D.C. CODE ANN. § 21-2208(a)
(1989) (same); IOWA CODE ANN. § 144B.8(1) (West Supp. 1992) (revocation may be
made by notifying agent or health care provider orally or in writing); NEV. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 449.830 (Michie 1991) (same as California); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 137-J:6(I)(a) (Supp. 1991) (power revoked by written or oral notice to agent or
health or residential care provider); N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW § 2985(1)(a)
(McKinney Supp. 1991) (power revoked upon written or oral notice to agent or
health care provider); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 32A-20(b) (1991) (revocation effective
upon communication to agent and attending physician); N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-06.5-
07(1) (1991) (power revoked upon notice to agent or health care or long-term care
services provider); OR. REV. STAT. § 127.545(1) (1991) (revocation effective upon
communication to attending physician or health care provider, or to agent who must
promptly inform the attending physician); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-4.10-2 (1989)
(revocation of agent's authority upon oral or written notice to agent or to treating
doctor, hospital, or other health care provider); TEx. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE
ANN. § 135.005(a)(1) (West Supp. 1992) (revocation upon oral or written notice to
agent or to health or residential care provider); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 3457(a)(1)
(1989) (same); W. VA. CODE § 16-30A-13 (1991) (written or oral revocation effective
upon communication to attending physician). Notification is also a familiar
requirement under the living will statutes. Most provide that a verbal or written
revocation is not effective until communicated to the attending physician. See
MEISEL, supra note 7, § 11.18, at 372.
186 See GA. CODE ANN. § 31-36-6(a)(3) (Michie 1991) (within 30 days); ILL_
ANN. STAT. ch. 110V2, para. 804-6(a)(3) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1992) (no time limit
specified); W. VA. CODE § 16-30A-13(c) (1991) (contemporaneously).
187 See WIs. STAT. ANN. § 155.40(1)(c) (West Supp. 1991).
18 Statutory provisions that revoke a former spouse as agent vary widely in their
details and reflect similar variation found in state statutes on the effect of a divorce
or other marital dissolution on a spouse's rights under a will. The most drastic
revoke the power itself. See IOWA CODE ANN. § 144B.12(3) (West Supp. 1992)
(dissolution of marriage); N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-06.5-07(c) (1991) (divorce); OR.
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In contrast to their responsiveness to a principal's efforts to
revoke a power, many health care statutes do not adequately address
another means by which a power is sometimes revoked, the revoca-
tion by a guardian. Instead of recognizing the qualitative difference
between a health care power and a property power, the statutes
allow their property power provisions to control by default. The
health care power is either automatically revoked upon a guardian's
appointment8 9 or the guardian may revoke the power following the
appointment.190 Nevertheless, under a health care power, honoring
the principal's express wishes, as interpreted by the agent, is more
important than under a property power, especially when matters of
REV. STAT. § 127.545(5) (1991) (dissolution of marriage or annulment); TEX. Civ.
PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 135.005(a)(3) (West Supp. 1992) (divorce); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 14, § 3457(a)(3) (1989) (divorce); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 155.40(2) (West Supp.
1990) (divorce or annulment). The most obscure provide that upon divorce or legal
separation, the spouse is deemed to have died. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. l10V2, para.
802-6(b) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1992) (general provision applicable to all types of
powers of attorney). The most advanced revoke the spouse's designation, not the
power itself, but revive the designation in the event of remarriage. See CAL CIV.
CODE § 2437(e) (West Supp. 1992) (dissolution of marriage or annulment); D.C.
CODE ANN. § 21-2208(e) (1989) (same). Another variant is to revoke the power, but
if an alternate agent is named, to only revoke the spouse's designation. See N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 137-J:6(I)(c) (Supp. 1991) (divorce); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 32A-
20(c) (1991) (divorce or legal separation). The simplest merely remove the spouse
as agent or revoke the spouse's designation. See GA. CODE ANN. § 31-36-6(b)
(Michie 1991) (dissolution of marriage or annulment); IDAHO CODE § 39-4505
(Supp. 1992) (dissolution of marriage); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 449.860(2) (Michie
1991) (divorce); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2985(1)(e) (McKinney Supp. 1992)
(divorce or legal separation); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-4.10-2 (1989) (dissolution of
marriage); W. VA. CODE § 16-30A-13(d) (1991) (divorce).
189 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 32A-22(a) (1991). Although its health care statute is
silent, the general durable power statute in Kentucky provides that the appointment
of a guardian automatically revokes a power. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 386.093
(Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1984).
190 Kansas has so provided in its durable power for health care statute, however,
the provision is taken almost verbatim from its general durable power statute.
Compare KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58-627(a) (Supp. 1991) (health care power) with id.
§ 58-612(a) (1983) (general durable power). Several other jurisdictions have granted
guardians the right in their general durable power provisions. See, e.g., D.C. CODE
ANN. § 21-2083(a) (1989); IDAHO CODE § 15-5-503(1) (Supp. 1992); NEV. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 111.460 (Michie 1986); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 34-22-6.1 (1984).
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life or death are involved. 191 Arguably, to recognize those prefer-
ences, revocation by a guardian should not be automatic. Some
justification should be required.
Fortunately, several states require the proper level of justifica-
tion. Solutions include granting a preference to the agent to act as
guardian,192 and requiring that the guardian petition the court to
revoke the power t93 or remove the agent. 194 These solutions are
191 No durable power, no matter how detailed, can possibly anticipate every
situation that may arise. Nor should it. Drafting flexible guidelines permits an agent
to respond to unforeseen circumstances with reference to the principal's value system
and with knowledge of the principal's probable preferences. This ability to appoint
a person who is familiar with the patient's value system and preferences is one of the
principal benefits of the durable power for health care. A guardian, due to
unfamiliarity, may simply be unable to make the same level of qualitative decision.
See John J. Lombard, Jr., The Incompetent Patient's Right to Refitse or Terminate
Treatment, in REFUSAL OR TERMINATION OF MEDICAL TREATMENT: WHO
DECIDES? ch. D, at 29-30 (1990) (program materials for seminar presented at 1990
annual meeting of the American Bar Association).
192 See W. VA. CODE § 16-30A-4(e) (Supp. 1990); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 880.33(5)
(West 1991) (guardianship provision). Both provisions appear to eliminate the
necessity of nominating the agent as guardian in the power. However, such
nomination is still desirable to clarify the principal's intent.
193 California and Oregon allow judicial revocation upon a finding that, among
other things, the agent is unfit, the agent has not acted consistently with the
principal's desires, or the agent has not acted in the principal's best interests. See
CAL CIV. CODE § 2412.5 (West Supp. 1991); OR. REV. STAT. § 127.550 (1991).
Wisconsin provides that the appointment of a guardian automatically revokes a
power unless a court determines that the power should continue in effect. See Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 155.60(2) (West Supp. 1991).
194 New York authorizes a guardian to petition for judicial removal of an agent.
N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2992 (McKinney Supp. 1991). New Hampshire, Texas,
and Vermont provide that the court, upon petition of a guardian, may suspend or
terminate an agent's powers. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1374:12 (Supp. 1991); TEx.
CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 135.006 (West Supp. 1992); VT. STAT. ANN.
§ 3463(a) (1989). Georgia and Illinois require a court order before a guardian may
exercise any of the principal's powers, including the power to revoke the instrument
or remove the agent. See GA. CODE ANN. § 31-36-6(c) (Michie 1991); ILL ANN.
STAT. ch. 110 Y, paras. 802-5, -10 (Smith-lurd Supp. 1992). Iowa provides that an
agent has priority over a guardian unless the court finds that the agent is acting
contrary to the principal's wishes. IOWA CODE ANN. § 144B.6(1) (West Supp. 1992).
North Dakota provides that an agent has priority unless a court determines
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then supplemented by the best defense against a guardian's attack,
clear mention in the statutory form of the option of nominating the
agent as guardian. 195
3. Who MayActAs Agent
Conflicts of interest abound in estates and trusts practice.
Fiduciaries frequently have beneficial interests that are adverse to the
interests of other beneficiaries or a fiduciary may be involved on both
sides of a transaction. This potential for conflict applies fully to
agents acting under durable powers. For example, the agent may be
a joint tenant with the principal or may benefit from a gift pro-
gram. 196 Similarly, the execution of a power may offer the agent an
increased opportunity to exercise undue influence.
197
The law has developed a number of remedies for persons
aggrieved by an agent's misuse of trust. 198 As to property powers,
the remedies have not included the disqualification of certain classes
otherwise. N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-06.5-13(1) (1991).
195 See CAL CIV. CODE § 2500 (West Supp. 1991); GA. CODE ANN. § 31-36-
10(a) (Michie 1991); ILL ANN. STAT. ch. 110 1/2, para. 804-10(a) (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1992); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 32A-25 (1991). For a discussion of some of the reasons
for nominating the agent as guardian, see supra note 19. For the comparable
provisions under the statutory short-forms, see supra note 64 and accompanying text.
196 See, e.g., In re Estate of Rogers, 725 P.2d 544 (Mont. 1986) (wife, as agent
under durable power granted by husband, assigned notes and deeds of trust from her
husband to herself).
197 Conversely, granting a power may make it more difficult for others to exert
undue influence. See, e.g., In re Estate of Till, 458 N.W.2d 521 (S.D. 1990) (friend
who received bulk of estate under will arranged to have family member dismissed as
agent).
198 An agent is held to the standards of a trustee. Like a trustee, an agent owes
the principal a duty of loyalty. An agent must act solely for the benefit of the
principal, must account for profits, may not take an adverse position without the
principal's knowledge, and must deal fairly with the principal and disclose all relevant
facts. Upon a breach by an agent, the principal may bring an action for damages or
equitable relief, including the removal of the agent. See generally RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 387-399 (1957).
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of persons from acting as agent.199 Disqualification is, however, a
prominent feature of the statutory form health care powers.
Generally, health care providers, nursing home operators, and their
employees may not be designated as agent.2°°
This result may be attributable, in part, to the doctrine of
informed consent, a doctrine that emphasizes a patient's right to self-
determination. To effectuate that right, the patient is entitled to a
full disclosure of risks and alternatives, putting the patient in a better
position for making an informed decision as to how to proceed. If a
patient lacks the capacity to express health care preferences, the
patient's role is transferred to a surrogate who must follow the
patient's previously expressed preferences. 20 ' The proper role of a
health care provider, however, is to make recommendations as to
appropriate care, recommendations that may or may not be
consistent with the patient's preferences.
To prevent a hopeless conflict between a provider's duty and a
patient's possibly inconsistent preferences, 2 2 a variety of agent
199 Missouri is an exception. See supra note 40. Missouri also has enacted a
detailed code of fiduciary conduct. See supra note 41.
200 For an analysis of the statutes, see infra notes 203-10 and accompanying text.
In general, the other types of durable power for health care statutes do not address
agent qualifications. Virginia and Washington are among the exceptions. See supra
notes 121-22.
201 For a comprehensive discussion of the ethical and legal basis for the doctrine
of informed consent and the role of the surrogate, see PAUL S. APPLEBAUM ET AL,
INFORMED CONSENT chs. 2, 5 (1987). The obligation to follow a patient's express
preferences or values is not absolute. Countervailing state interests include the
preservation of life, the prevention of suicide, the protection of third parties, and the
protection of professional ethics. See MEISEL, supra note 7, §§ 4.13-.16, at 100-06.
202 See Paul B. Solnick, Proxy Consent for Incompetent Non-Terminally Ill Adult
Patients, 6 J. LEGAL MED. 1, 16-17 (1985) (footnote omitted):
Since patients have the right to refuse their physicians' proposed
treatment or procedures and to accept alternative forms of
treatment which may not be as acceptable to their physicians, this
right would tend to be negated if physicians, with their bias
toward health care, were placed in the position of making proxy
decisions on behalf of incompetent patients. This would
contravene the patient's right of autonomy and self-determi-
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disqualification provisions have been enacted, including a ban against
the attending physician and the physician's employees, 20 3 disqualifica-
tion of individuals affiliated with health care institutions, 2 04 and,
most commonly, a prohibition against all treating health care
providers and their employees. 205  A majority of the statutes,
however, permit as agents family members who coincidentally happen
nation.
203 N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2981(3)(c) (McKinney Supp. 1992) (attending
physician); OR. REV. STAT. § 127.520(1) (1990) (attending physician and employees).
204 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58-629(d) (Supp. 1991) (employees, owners, directors,
and officers of facility); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.972(3) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill
Supp. 1991) (employees, owners, directors, or officers of health care facility in which
principal is a resident or patient); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 449.820 (Michie Supp.
1989) (operators and employees of health care facilities); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW
§ 2981(3)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1992) (operators, administrators or employees of
hospital in which principal is a patient or has applied for admission); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 127.520(2) (1991) (owners, operators and employees of health care facility in which
principal is a patient or resident); W. VA. CODE § 16-30A-6(c) (1991) (operators and
employees of health care facility serving the principal); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 155.05(3)
(West Supp. 1991) (employees of health care facility in which principal is a patient
or resident, and spouses of those employees). For provisions directed specifically at
nursing home operators and employees, see infra note 209 and accompanying text.
205 CAL CIV. CODE § 2432(b) (West Supp. 1992) (treating health care providers
and employees); D.C. CODE ANN. § 21-2209 (1989) (health care providers who
request principal to execute power); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 31-36-3(4), -5(b) (Michie
Supp. 1990) (health care providers and their employees and agents who are directly
or indirectly involved in principal's health care); IDAHO CODE § 39-4505 (Supp.
1992) (treating health care providers and employees); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 1101/2,
paras. 804-4(d), -5 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1991) (attending physician and treating health
care providers); IOWA CODE ANN. § 144B.4 (West Supp. 1992) (health care
providers and employees of health care providers attending the principal); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 58-629(d) (Supp. 1991) (treating health care providers and employees);
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 449.820 (Michie Supp. 1989) (principal's health care
providers and employees); N.H. REV. STAT. § 137-J:4 (Supp. 1991) (same); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 32A-18 (1991) (persons providing health care to principal for
renumeration); N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-06.5-04 (1991) (principal's health care
providers and employees); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-4.10-2 (1989) (treating health care
providers and employees); TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 135.003 (West
Supp. 1992) (principal's health care providers and employees); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
14, § 3455 (1989) (same); W. VA. CODE § 16-30A-6(c) (1991) (treating health care
providers and employees); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 155.05(3) (West Supp. 1991)
(principal's health care providers and employees and their spouses).
386 27 REAL PROPERTY, PROBATE AND TRUST JOURNAL
to be employees.' Apparently, state legislatures assume that a
family member will have sufficient independence of judgment from
the health care provider or employer, or believe that the importance
of satisfying the desire of most principals to name a family member
as agent outweighs the possible risks. 2 7
As was the case with execution requirements, 28 the statutes
also reflect a concern over possible patient abuse. For example, a
majority of the jurisdictions prohibit the operators of nursing homes
and nonfamily employees from being designated agents. 209  A
majority also prohibit health care facilities from requiring the
execution of a power as a condition for admission.210
206 CAL. CIV. CODE § 2432.5 (West Supp. 1992); IDAHO CODE § 39-4505 (Supp.
1990); IOWA CODE ANN. § 144B.4 (West Supp. 1992); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58-
629(d)(1) (Supp. 1991); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.972(3) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill
Supp. 1990); NEV. REV. STAT. § 449.820(2) (Michie 1991); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 1374:4 (Supp. 1991); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2981(3)(b)(i) (McKinney Supp.
1992); N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-06.5-04 (1991); OR. REV. STAT. § 127.520 (1991); R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 23-4.10-2 (1989); TEX. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 135.003
(West Supp. 1992); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 3455 (1989); W. VA. CODE § 16-30A-
6(c) (1991); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 155.05(3) (West Supp. 1991).
207 See supra note 172 and accompanying text.
208 See supra notes 156-59 and accompanying text.
209 See CAL CIV. CODE § 2432(b)(1) (West Supp. 1992) (community care
facilities, residential care facilities for the elderly); IDAHO CODE § 39-4505 (Supp.
1990) (community care facilities); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58-629(a)(2), (d) (Supp. 1989)
(hospitals, psychiatric hospitals and treatment facilities, hospices, and nursing homes);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1374:4 (Supp. 1991) (residential care providers); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 23-06.5-04 (1991) (long-term care services providers); R.I. GEN. LAWS
§ 23-4.10-2 (1989) (community care facilities); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.
§ 135.003 (West Supp. 1992) (residential care providers); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14,
§ 3455 (1989) (same). This list is not exhaustive. The statutes in a number of
jurisdictions encompass various types of nursing homes within their definitions of
"health care provider" or "health care facility." For a partial list, see infra note 221.
2 10 See, e.g., CAL CIV. CODE § 2441 (West Supp. 1991); D.C. CODE ANN. § 21-
2209 (1989) (adds that health care facility may request execution commencing 48
hours after admission); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.984(3) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill
Supp. 1990) (general prohibition against requiring execution as condition for
receiving health care); N.Y. Pun. HEALTH LAW §§ 2988, 2991 (McKinney Supp.
1991) (adds that residential health care and mental hygiene facilities must establish
procedures to ensure the voluntary creation of proxies).
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4. General Health Care Authority
A durable power for health care differs from a living will in
several fundamental respects. Perhaps the most important difference
is the class of treatment to which each is directed. A durable power
for health care, unlike a living will, can be used as a method for
implementing decisions for all types of health care, not just decisions
regarding the withholding or withdrawing of life-sustaining treat-
ment.21 ' This objective is most apparent in the provisions that
authorize a principal to grant an agent all authority that the principal
could have exercised were the principal not incapacitated.212 These
general provisions, though, are only a starting point in illuminating
both the scope of authority that the principal may grant and the
consequent role of the agent.
The statutes, as their name implies, are directed at "health
care," which is most commonly defined as "any care, treatment,
service, or procedure to maintain, diagnose, or treat an individual's
This prohibition against overreaching is directly traceable to the living will
statutes, many of which prohibit a facility from requiring the execution of a living will
as a condition for admission or for receiving care. See, e.g., CAL HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE § 7192(c) (West Supp. 1991).
211 For a discussion of some of the other differences, see supra note 117 and
accompanying text. The statement in the text is a generalization which is not
applicable in all jurisdictions. A number of the statutory form health care powers
prohibit an agent from making certain types of health care decisions. See infra notes
224-26 and accompanying text.
212 See, e.g., CAL CIV. CODE § 2434(b) (West Supp. 1991); D.C. CODE ANN.
§ 21-2206(a) (1989); GA. CODE ANN. § 31-36-4 (Michie Supp. 1990); IDAHO CODE
§ 39-4505 (Supp. 1990); ILL ANN. STAT. ch. 110 1/2, para. 804-3 (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1990); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.978(1) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1990); OR.
REV. STAT. § 127.535(1) (1991); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-4.10-2 (1989); TEX. Civ.
PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 135.002(a) (West Supp. 1992). Illinois, in addition,
authorizes a principal to delegate the authority to make health care decisions for a
minor child but did not design its statutory form to cover that possibility. See ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 110V, paras. 804-3, -10(a) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1990).
388 27 REAL PROPERTY, PROBATE AND TRUST JOURNAL
physical or mental condition."213 This definition is then incorporat-
ed into "health care decision," which typically includes "consent,
refusal of consent, or withdrawal of consent to health care. "214
These definitions are then carried into the forms, which, unless a
principal otherwise specifies, authorize an agent to make all health
care decisions that the principal could have made.21 s
The agent, therefore, has authority to accept or reject the
recommendations of treating professionals and to consent to
medication and surgical procedures.2 16 The selection of profession-
als and admission to or discharge from health care facilities is also
covered, either by express provision 21 7 or by implication from other
213 CAL CIV. CODE § 2430(b) (West Supp. 1991). Substantive variations are
found in Idaho, whose definition authorizes decisions as to physical condition only,
IDAHO CODE § 39-4505 (Supp. 1990); Georgia, Illinois, and North Carolina which
specifically encompass personal care within their definitions, GA. CODE ANN. § 31-
36-3(2) (Michie Supp. 1990); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110 1/2, para. 804-4(b) (Smith-
Hurd Supp. 1990); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 32A-16(1) (1991); and Oregon, which refers
to "disease, injury and degenerative conditions" instead of to "physical or mental
condition," OR. REV. STAT. § 127.505(4) (1991).
214 CAL CIV. CODE § 2430(c) (West Supp. 1991). Wisconsin requires an
"informed decision." WIS. STAT. ANN. § 155.01(5) (West Supp. 1991). Kentucky
appears to severely limit the agent's authority to refuse treatment. It requires that
the agent's decisions must be made in accordance with accepted medical practice.
See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.978(1) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1990).
215 See, e.g., CAL CIV. CODE § 2500 (West Supp. 1991). But see infra notes
224-26 and accompanying text for prohibited forms of consent.
216 Only Georgia, Illinois, North Carolina, and West Virginia expressly authorize
consent to medication and surgical procedures. See GA. CODE ANN. § 31-36-
10(b)(1) (Michie Supp. 1990); ILL ANN. STAT. ch. 110V2, para. 804-10(b)(1) (Smith-
Hurd Supp. 1990); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 32A-25 (1991); W. VA. CODE § 16-30A-
4(d)(1) (Supp. 1990). Consent would nonetheless be authorized under the other
statutes as a treatment for "an individual's physical or mental condition." See supra
text accompanying notes 213-15.
217 See CAL CIv. CODE § 2504 (West Supp. 1992); D.C. CODE ANN. § 21-
2206(a)(5) (1989); GA. CODE ANN. § 31-36-10(b)(2) (Michie Supp. 1990); ILL ANN.
STAT. ch. 110V2, para. 804-10(b)(2) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1990); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58-
629(a)(2) (Supp. 1991); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 32A-25 (1991); W. VA. CODE § 16-30A-
4(d) (Supp. 1990).
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statutory provisions.2 8  The general definition of "health care,"
however, was not necessarily intended to include nursing home care,
particularly care that is primarily custodial in nature.2 9 Only a few
states have directly tackled this issue.220 Other jurisdictions appear
to authorize an agent to consent to nursing home care to varying
extents, 22' but a careful drafter will add a special provision on this
topic.22 2  Like the statutory short-forms directed primarily at
property management, all of the health care forms recognize that a
principal may insert special provisions, desires, or limitations. 223
218 A competent person has the right to select treating professionals and to seek
admission and discharge from health care facilities. An agent, therefore, is
authorized to make those decisions for an incapacitated principal because the agent
succeeds to all of the principal's authority. See supra note 215 and accompanying
text.
219 The comments to the MODEL HEALTH-CARE CONSENT ACT, the act from
which the definitions of health care were derived, state that "health care" includes
nursing care provided at a hospital but does not include routine care provided by the
family at home. UNIF. LAW COMMISSIONERS' MODEL HEALTH-CARE CONSENT ACT
§ 1 cmt., 9 U.L.A. pt. 1, at 457-58 (1988). Where the line would be drawn between
those two extremes is unclear.
220 Solutions include defining "health care" to include "personal care" in addition
to granting agents authority to admit or discharge principals from nursing homes,
GA. CODE ANN. §§ 31-36-3(2), -10(b)(2) (Michie Supp. 1990); ILL_ ANN. STAT. ch.
110 1/2, paras. 804-4(b), -10(b)(2) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1990); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 32A-
16(1), -25 (1991), granting agents authority to make decisions as to home health care
and care and treatment at nursing homes, W. VA. CODE § 16-30A-4(d)(1) (Supp.
1990), granting agents authority to make necessary arrangements at nursing homes,
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58-629(a)(2) (Supp. 1989), and prohibiting agents from approving
more than a temporary stay at a nursing home absent specific authority in the power,
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 155.20(2)(c)(2) (West Supp. 1991).
221 This result is suggested in several jurisdictions, for example, by rather
expansive definitions of "health care facility." See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 311.970(7) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1990) (licensed nursing care facility); OR.
REV. STAT. § 127.505(6) (1991) (residential care facilities, adult foster care homes,
group care homes).
222 The following provision has been suggested: "To make all necessary
arrangements for me at any hospital, hospice, nursing home, convalescent home or
similar establishment and to assure that all my essential needs are provided for at
such a facility." Collin, supra note 117, 505.5(D).
223 See CAL CIV. CODE § 2500 (West Supp. 1991); D.C. CODE ANN. § 21-2207
(1989); GA. CODE ANN. § 31-36-10(a) (Michie Supp. 1990); IDAHO CODE § 394505
(Supp. 1990); ILL ANN. STAT. ch. 110 1/2, para. 804-10(a) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1990);
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Not all "health care decisions" can be delegated to an agent.
Several statutes prohibit an agent from authorizing commitment to
mental health facilities, the more invasive forms of mental health
treatment, and sensitive reproduction matters.224  Some statutes
also place substantial restrictions on an agent's ability to withdraw or
withhold life-sustaining treatment, a topic that is discussed in the next
section.3 Furthermore, a substantial majority of the jurisdictions
IOWA CODE ANN. § 144B.5 (West Supp. 1992); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58-632 (Supp.
1989); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.980 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1990); NEV.
REV. STAT. ANN.§ 449.830 (Michie Supp. 1989); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1374:15
(Supp. 1991); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2981(5)(d) (McKinney Supp. 1990); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 32A-25 (1991); N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-06.5-17 (1991); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 127.530 (1991); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-4.10-2 (1989); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.
CODE ANN. § 135.016 (West Supp. 1992); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 3466 (1991); W.
VA. CODE § 16-30A-18 (Supp. 1990); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 155.30(3) (West Supp.
1992).
224 See CAL CIV. CODE § 2435 (West Supp. 1991) (commitment or placement
in mental health treatment facility, convulsive treatment, psychosurgery, sterilization,
abortion); GA. CODE ANN. § 31-36-10(b)(1) (Michie Supp. 1990) (psychosurgery,
sterilization, involuntary mental health hospitalization or treatment); NEV. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 449.850 (Michie Supp. 1989) (commitment or placement in mental
health treatment facility, convulsive treatment, psychosurgery, sterilization, abortion);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 137-J:2(V) (Supp. 1991) (voluntary admission to state
institution or voluntary sterilization); N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-06.5-03(5) (1991)
(psycho-surgery, abortion, sterilization, or more than 45-day admission to mental
health facility, state institution, or security unit of long-term care facility); OR. REV.
STAT. § 127.540 (1991) (commitment or placement in mental health facility,
convulsive treatment, psychosurgery, sterilization, abortion); TEX. CIV. PRAC. &
REM. CODE ANN. § 135.002(f) (West Supp. 1992) (voluntary inpatient mental health
services, convulsive treatment, psychosurgery, abortion); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14,
§ 3453(e) (1989) (voluntary admission to state institution or voluntary sterilization);
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 155.20 (West Supp. 1991) (mental health hospitalization,
experimental mental health research, psychosurgery, electroconvulsive treatment,
other drastic mental health treatments). The extent to which authorization of such
treatments is prohibited in the other jurisdictions, whether by separate statute, case
law, or constitutional principle, is a topic well beyond the scope of this article. For
a comprehensive discussion, see SAMUEL J. BRAKEL ET AL, THE MENTALLY
DISABLED AND THE LAW (1985).
225 See infra text accompanying notes 245-52.
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authorize an agent to make decisions only if the principal lacks
capacity.226  At its worst, capacity is defined as the ability to com-
municate decisions rationally. 2 At its best, it is defined in terms
of the patient's level of understanding. 2  Finally, a number of the
statutes prescribe the procedure for determining capacity, although
many add little to existing clinical practice. 229
226 The principal exceptions are Georgia and Illinois. Under their statutory
forms, an agent's authority commences upon execution unless the principal expressly
provides otherwise. GA. CODE ANN. § 31-36-10(a) (Michie Supp. 1990); ILL ANN.
STAT. ch. 110 /, para. 804-10(a) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1992).
227 See IDAHO CODE § 39-4505 (Supp. 1990). A rationality standard is
inappropriate because it suggests that a principal must conform to what society
deems rational, and not to what may be best for the principal in light of the
principal's values. A similar standard in the guardianship context, the ability to
"make or communicate responsible decisions," has received like criticism. See ABA
COMM'N ON THE MENTALLY DISABLED, COMM'N ON LEGAL PROBLEMS OF THE
ELDERLY, GUARDIANSHIP: AN AGENDA FOR REFORM 15 (1989). The President's
Commission also rejected a rationality standard. See PRESIDENT'S COMM'N, supra
note 169, at 61,174. For another example of a rationality test, see supra note 68.
228 Exactly what constitutes "capacity" has not received extensive judicial
attention. The developing consensus, however, at least among commentators, is to
define capacity in terms of a patient's ability to appreciate the nature, extent, and
probable consequences of the proposed treatment. See MEISEL, supra note 7, § 2.17,
at 32.
This evolving standard toward a test based on patient understanding is
reflected in several of the health care statutes. For example, capacity has been
defined as "the ability to understand and appreciate the nature and consequences of
a health care decision, including the significant benefits and harms of and reasonable
alternatives to any proposed health care." TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.
§ 135.001(4) (West Supp. 1992); see also D.C. CODE ANN. § 21-2202(5) (1989); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 137-J:1(IV) (Supp. 1991); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2980(3)
(McKinney Supp. 1991); N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-06.5-02(3) (1991); VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 14, § 3452(3) (1989); W. VA. CODE § 16-30A-3 (Supp. 1990). It has been defined
as the ability to "understand the general nature of the health care procedure." GA.
CODE ANN. § 31-36-7(1) (Michie Supp. 1990). It has also been defined as the
"ability to receive and evaluate information effectively or communicate decisions,"
OR. REV. STAT. § 127.505(8) (1991); see also WIS. STAT. ANN. § 155.01(8) (West
Supp. 1991); or, in an abbreviated form, as the "ability to receive and evaluate
information effectively." KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58-629(b) (Supp. 1989); id. § 59-3002(a).
229 Under existing clinical practice, a determination of incapacity typically is
made by the attending physician, often informally. "Clinical determinations of
incompetence are frequently not overt. They are so routinely made in clinical
settings that it strains the meaning of the word 'determination' to characterize them
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All of the statutes impose guidelines for making health care
decisions, guidelines which are drawn from the evolving case law on
the termination of life support.230 At a minimum, an agent must
follow the principal's desires as expressed in the document. The
written desires are then supplemented, under a majority of the
statutes, by other preferences that the principal may have expressed
or that are otherwise made known. 23 I If a principal's desires
concerning a particular course of treatment are unknown, the agent
as such." MEISEL, supra note 7, § 8.7, at 212. A number of the statutes merely
codify the prevalent clinical practice by requiring that the determination be made by
the attending physician. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58-629(b) (Supp. 1991). Other
states have gone much further. Heightened standards that have been enacted
include: a requirement that the determination be made by two physicians, OR. REV.
STAT. § 127.535(1) (1991); by two physicians, one of whom must be a psychiatrist,
D.C. CODE ANN. § 21-2204(a) (1989); or in lieu of two physicians, by a physician and
licensed psychologist, W. VA. CODE § 16-30A-3 (Supp. 1990); WIs. STAT. ANN.
§ 155.05(2) (West Supp. 1991). Other innovations include a requirement that a copy
of the determination be sent to the agent, and to the principal, if able to compre-
hend, N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2983(3) (McKinney Supp. 1991); a requirement
that a copy of the determination be appended to the power, WIs. STAT. ANN.
§ 155.05(2) (West Supp. 1990); and a provision that the principal may designate in
the power the physician or physicians who are to make the capacity determination.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 32A-20(a) (1991) (statute); id. § 32A-25 (form).
230 For a comprehensive discussion of the judicially created tests, see MEISEL,
supra note 7, §§ 9.1-.35.
231 Preferences might be manifested in other written documents, through oral
statements made to the agent or to others and, under some of the statutes, through
a consideration of the principal's values and other factors that give hints as to what
the principal would have decided. The most commonly enacted standard is that the
agent must act consistently with the desires expressed in the power or otherwise
made known. CAL CIV. CODE § 2434(b) (West Supp. 1991); IDAHO CODE § 39-4505
(Supp. 1990); IOWA CODE ANN. § 144B.6(2) (West Supp. 1992); NEV. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 449.830 (Michie Supp. 1989); OR. REV. STAT. § 127.535(4) (1991); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 23.4.10-2 (1989); W. VA. CODE § 16-30A-4(b) (Supp. 1990). Alternatively,
the agent must make the decision in accordance with the principal's wishes, including
religious and moral beliefs. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 137-J:2(II) (Supp. 1991); N.Y.
PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2982(2) (McKinney Supp. 1991); N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-06.5-
03(2)(a) (1991); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 135.002(e)(1) (West Supp.
1992); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 3453(b)(1) (1989). The standard, however, that
most accurately describes an agent's function under a durable power for health care
is that the agent must make the decision that the principal would have made. See
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.978(1) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1990).
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must act in the principal's best interests. 232
However, for a decision to be informed, the agent must have
access to relevant medical information. Nearly all of the statutes
expressly grant agents the right to such information, including the
rights to receive, to review, and to consent to the disclosure of their
principal's medical records and other relevant information.
33
Access to records, however, is meaningless unless there is an agent
232 Stating that an agent must act in the principal's best interests is one thing.
Actually defining what is meant by that standard is quite another. This difficulty has
led one commentator to conclude that the best interests standard "is too vague to be
of useful guidance either to surrogates or courts." MEISEL, supra note 7, § 9.8, at
265. This lack of precision has not gone unnoticed in the statutory form health care
powers. To avoid a search for a single standard of objectivity, several of the statutes
give agents a wide degree of latitude in applying the test. An agent is permitted to
make the decision in accordance with the agent's assessment of the principal's best
interests. N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-06.5-03(2)(b) (1991); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.
CODE ANN. § 135.002(e)(2) (West Supp. 1992); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 3453(b)(2)
(1989). Alternatively, the agent need only follow the agent's good faith belief as to
the principal's best interests. D.C. CODE ANN. § 21-2206(c)(2) (1989); OR. REV.
STAT. § 127.535(4) (1990). More restrictive is the New Hampshire standard, which
requires that the agent's assessment of the principal's best interests be in accordance
with accepted medical practice. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 137-J:2(II) (Supp.
1991).
233 The least expansive of the statutes provide that agents may examine their
principal's medical records and consent to their disclosure. IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 144B.7 (West Supp. 1992); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 449.830 (Michie 1991).
Several jurisdictions expand the right to examine to include not just medical records
but all information relating to proposed health care. CAL CIV. CODE § 2436 (West
Supp. 1992); D.C. CODE ANN. § 21-2206 (1989); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2982(3)
(McKinney Supp. 1992); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 32A-25 (1991); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 127.535(3) (1991); W. VA. CODE § 16-30A-12 (1991). Several also clarify that the
information may be either oral or written and relate to either physical or mental
health, and that agents are authorized to execute releases and other documents to
obtain that information. IDAHO CODE § 39-4505 (Supp. 1992); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 58-629(a)(3) (Supp. 1991); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 137J:7 (Supp. 1991); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 23-06.5-08 (1991); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-4.10-2 (1989); TEX. Civ.
PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 135.007 (West Supp. 1992); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14,
§ 3458 (1989); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 155.30(3) (West Supp. 1992). Georgia and Illinois,
though, eliminate any possibility of health care provider discretion. An agent has the
right to examine any records that the agent deems relevant. GA. CODE ANN. § 31-
36-7(3) (Michie 1991); ILL ANN. STAT. ch. 110 1/2, para. 804-7(c) (Smith-Hurd
Supp. 1992).
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who is both available and willing to act. Several of the statutory
forms state that only one agent may be named, 234 and the other
forms, with only a couple exceptions, make no provision for the
appointment of co-agents. 25 The unavailable agent could, there-
fore, pose a problem. This potential difficulty is remedied, at least in
part, through the concept of the alternate agent. The alternate agent
not only succeeds to the predecessor's duties upon the predecessor's
death, resignation, or incapacity, but has authority to make a decision
when the predecessor is otherwise unavailable or unwilling. 23 6  A
few of the states that enacted statutory forms, however, elected to
keep the traditional successor agent.
237
234 See CAL CIV. CODE § 2500 (West Supp. 1992); IDAHO CODE § 39-4505
(Supp. 1992); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 1101/2, para. 804-10(a) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1992);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-06.5-17 (1991); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-4.10-2 (1989). This
prohibition is in sharp contrast to the statutory short-forms directed primarily at
property matters. None prohibit the appointment of multiple agents, and several
facilitate such appointments. See supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text. The
prohibition against the designation of multiple agents appears to reflect a concern
about possible conflicts among the decisionmakers and the possible unavailability of
one or more of the designated agents.
235 The instructions to the Georgia form provide that a principal may name co-
agents. GA. CODE ANN. § 31-36-10(a) (Michie 1991). The statutory form in
Kentucky specifically mentions the appointment of "surrogate(s)." KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 311.980 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1990).
236 See CAL CIV. CODE § 2500 (West Supp. 1992) (provides for designation of
up to two alternates); D.C. CODE § 21-2207 (1989) (same); IDAHO CODE § 39-4505
(Supp. 1990) (same); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 449.830 (Michie Supp. 1989) (same);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1374:15 (Supp. 1991) (one alternate); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 23-06.5-17 (1991) (same); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-4.10-2 (1989) (two alternates);
TEx. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 135.016 (West Supp. 1992) (same); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 155.30(3) (West Supp. 1991) (one alternate). New York spells out the
theory of the alternate agent, but in its statute and not in its form. The designated
alternate may act if the predecessor is incapacitated, unwilling, or unavailable to act.
An agent is unavailable to act if the agent cannot be contacted after diligent efforts.
Should the original agent later become competent, willing, and available to act, the
authority of the alternate agent ceases. See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW §§ 2980(13),
2981(6) (McKinney Supp. 1992). Iowa and Oregon also authorize the appointment
of alternate agents in their statutes and not in their forms. See IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 144B.5(4) (West Supp. 1992); OR. REV. STAT. § 127.510(1) (1991).
237 See GA. CODE ANN. § 31-36-10(a) (Michie 1991) (two successors); ILL ANN.
STAT. ch. 1101/, para. 804-10(a) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1992) (same); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 32A-25 (1991) (same); W. VA. CODE § 16-30A-18 (1991) (one successor).
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Although the statutes are primarily directed at facilitating care
for the principal while the principal is alive, several authorize agents
to make decisions after their principal's death. Unless that portion of
the form is deleted, the agent may authorize organ donations, an
autopsy, and disposition of the remains.2 Besides their practical
benefit, these provisions modify the law of agency. The durable
power statutes not only reverse the common-law rule that a power
terminates upon incapacity, but they also reverse the rule that a
power terminates at death.239
5. Terminating Life-Support
One of the asserted benefits of the durable power for health
care is that it avoids many of the restrictions found in the living will
statutes. Through the use of a durable power, one no longer need
worry about complex definitions of the categories of patients for
whom life-sustaining treatment may be withheld or withdrawn, nor
about prohibitions against withholding or withdrawing certain forms
of treatment. Although held to a standard of care, the agent may act
for the principal regardless of the nature of the principal's condition
238 Several jurisdictions authorize all three. See CAL CIv. CODE § 2434(b)
(West Supp. 1991) (statute); id. § 2500 (form); GA. CODE ANN. § 31-36-7(4) (Michie
1991) (statute); id. § 31-36-10(a) (form); ILL ANN. STAT. ch. 110 1/2, para. 804-7(d)
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1992) (statute); id. para. 804-10(a) (form); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 58-629(a)(1) (Supp. 1991) (statute); id. § 58-632 (form); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 32A-
19(b) (1991) (statute); id. § 32A-25 (form). Two limit the authority to the donation
of organs. IDAHO CODE § 39-4505 (Supp. 1992); W. VA. CODE § 16-30A-4(d)(7)
(1991). Procedures for implementation of this authority are not necessarily
contained in the durable power statutes. A state's version of the Uniform
Anatomical Gift Act and a state's provisions on autopsy and consent to burial should
also be consulted. Illinois, for example, has made conforming amendments to its
provisions on autopsy and to its version of the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act. ILL
ANN. STAT. ch. 31, para. 42 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1990) (autopsy); id. ch. 1102, para.
303 (anatomical gifts).
239 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 120 (1957); supra notes 12-13
and accompanying text.
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or the type of treatment in question. 20
A majority of the statutory form health care powers contain this
level of flexibility. The statutory form health care powers have
generally steered clear of restrictive definitions of the classes of
patients from whom treatment may be withdrawn, restrictions that
have virtually nullified many living will statutes. 2 1 In addition, in
accordance with the weight of judicial and medical opinion, a
majority of statutory form health care powers neither prohibit nor
impose heightened standards of proof on decisions to withdraw or
withhold artificial nutrition and hydration.242  Furthermore, a
240 Leading commentators who have lamented the limitations of the living will
but have praised the durable power for health care include Areen, supra note 115,
at 230; Collin, supra note 117, 504.3; Lombard, supra note 191, at 24-30; and
MEISEL, supra note 7, § 10.12, at 332. None of these commentators, however,
focused on the detailed requirements of recent statutory form enactments.
241 Professor Gelfand noted that every living will act requires that the patient's
prognosis be "terminal" or the like. See Gelfand, supra note 138, at 740 & n.8. The
key, of course, is how "terminal" is defined. In at least 19 of the living will statutes,
the definition requires that death will occur shortly even if life-sustaining treatment
is provided. Id at 741 n.9. This restriction has led one court to state:
While other states do have statutes which define imminent death
under conditions where all medical treatment is continued, such
a definition effectively renders the statute useless. If death is
truly imminent even with the continuation of life-prolonging
procedures, there is no need to create a judicial or quasi-judicial
procedure for their withdrawal.
In re Guardianship of Browning, 543 So. 2d 258, 265 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989)
(footnote omitted), afrfd, 568 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1990).
242 The courts have generally refused to draw a distinction between artificial
nutrition and hydration and other forms of medical treatment. The principal
exception is Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 423 (Mo. 1988) ("And common
sense tells us that food and water do not treat an illness, they maintain a life."), affd
sub nom., Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990). The
American Medical Association has also refused to find a distinction. See COUNCIL
ON ETHICAL AND JUDICIAL AFFAIRS OF THE AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION,
CURRENT OPINIONS, Op. 2.20 (1989) ("Life-prolonging medical treatment includes
medication and artificially or technologically supplied respiration, nutrition or hydra-
tion."). As with all matters of public import, however, there are dissenting voices,
including that of the former Surgeon General. See C. Everett Koop, Decisions at the
End of Life, 5 ISSUES L. & MED. 225, 230 (1989) ("It is reasonable to say that we are
not being told [by the AMA] to let the terminal patient whose death is imminent go
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majority of the statutory forms do a fair job of assisting principals to
spell out special wishes, if a principal is so inclined. The principal is
warned that the authority of the agent extends to withholding or
withdrawing life support unless the principal chooses to modify the
form in spaces provided. 2A3 Moreover, several of the forms contain
a convenient check-the-box method for deciding different levels of
care.
244
A minority of the statutes, however, include restrictions
patterned after the living will statutes. Some of the restrictions relate
to the withholding or withdrawing of all forms of life-sustaining
treatment. Oregon requires that the condition be one that will
produce death whether or not life-sustaining treatment is with-
drawn,245 and West Virginia requires that continued treatment offer
quickly. We are starving him to death.").
243 See, e.g., CAL CIV. CODE § 2500 (West Supp. 1992) ("You should consider
whether you want to include a statement of your desires concerning life-prolonging
care, treatment, services, and procedures."); ILL ANN. STAT. ch. 110 1/2, para. 804-
10(a) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1992) ("The above grant of power is intended to be as
broad as possible so that your agent will have authority to make any decision you
could make to obtain or terminate any type of health care, including withdrawal of
food and water and other life-sustaining measures .... ); NEV. REV. STAT. § 449.830
(Michie 1991) ("Except as you otherwise specify in this document, the power of the
person you designate to make health care decisions for you may include the power
to consent to your doctor not giving treatment or stopping treatment which would
keep you alive."); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 3466 (1989) ("Here you may include any
specific desires or limitations you deem appropriate, such as when or what life-
sustaining measures should be withheld .... ).
244 The menu of options includes directions that treatment be withheld or
withdrawn if the agent believes that the burdens of treatment outweigh the expected
benefits, GA. CODE ANN. § 31-36-10(a) (Michie 1991); ILL ANN. STAT. ch. 10Y2,
para. 804-10(a) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1992); that treatment be withdrawn if there is no
reasonable prospect that the principal will regain the ability to act and think, VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 3466 (1989); that artificial nutrition and hydration be provided
in all events, id.; and that life-sustaining treatment be provided in all events, NEV.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 449.830 (Michie Supp. 1989).
245 Oregon requires that the condition be incurable, that the condition would,
within reasonable medical judgment, produce death regardless of whether life-
prolonging procedures are applied, and that life-prolonging procedures would serve
only to postpone the moment of death. OR. REV. STAT. § 127.505(12) (1991).
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no hope of medical benefit. 246 Restrictions have also been placed
on withholding or withdrawing artificial nutrition and hydration.
Kentucky requires the administration of artificial nutrition and
hydration unless the principal's death will occur within a few
days.247
Furthermore, a number of the statutes require that principals
specify their wishes regarding withdrawal of treatment. New York
prohibits agents from authorizing the withholding or withdrawal of
artificial nutrition unless the principal's wishes are reasonably
known.248 New Hampshire and Wisconsin prohibit agents from
withholding or withdrawing artificial nutrition and hydration unless
the power so authorizes.24 9 Oregon places severe limitations on an
agent's authority to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining treatment in
general, and artificial nutrition and hydration in particular, unless the
principal checks the appropriate spaces on the statutory form.25 0
24 6 See W. VA. CODE § 16-30A-4(d)(6) (1991) (also requiring that two physicians
certify the principal's condition).247 Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.978(3) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1990). Withdrawal
is otherwise permitted if physical assimilation is impossible or if the burdens of
providing artificial nutrition and hydration outweigh its benefits. However, in making
an assessment the agent may not consider the quality of the principal's continued
life.
248 N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2982(2) (McKinney Supp. 1992).
249 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 137-J:3(III) (Supp. 1991) (statute); id. § 1374:15
(form); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 155.20(4) (West Supp. 1991) (statute); id. § 155.30(3)
(form).
250 Oregon's mandatory statutory form provides:
I direct that my attorney-in-fact have authority to make decisions
regarding the following: _ Withholding or withdrawal of life-
sustaining procedures with the understanding that death may
result. __ Withholding or withdrawal of artificially administered
hydration or nutrition or both with the understanding that
dehydration, malnutrition and death may result.
OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 127.530 (1991). If a principal fails to check the line
authorizing the withdrawal of life-sustaining procedures, the agent may authorize the
withholding or withdrawal only if the principal is diagnosed as being irreversibly
comatose and the diagnosis is confirmed by the health facility's prognosis committee.
Id § 127.540(6). If a principal fails to check the line authorizing the withdrawal of
artificial hydration or nutrition, the agent may authorize the withholding or
withdrawal only if (a) the principal clearly and specifically stated, prior to incapacity,
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Finally, pregnant principals have not gone unnoticed. Wisconsin
prohibits an agent from making health care decisions for a pregnant
principal except as expressly authorized in the power.251 Kentucky
and New Hampshire prohibit withdrawal if there is a possibility that
the fetus could attain viability 5 2
Because the other statutory form enactments do not contain
living will restrictions does not necessarily mean that a principal is
free of those restrictions. A principal who has executed a living will
may, by that document, bind an agent under a health care power to
limitations on the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment found in the
living will and in the governing living will statute. Only four of the
statutory form health care enactments provide that a durable power
automatically supersedes a living will.2 3 Six others provide that a
power only supersedes a living will to the extent that the documents
conflict, 254 and the remainder are silent, preferring perhaps to let
that he or she would refuse artificial nutrition and hydration, (b) the principal is in
the final stage of a terminal illness and death will occur within a reasonably short
time whether or not such treatment is withheld or withdrawn, or (c) the administra-
tion of such treatment is not medically feasible or would cause severe, intractable, or
long-lasting pain. Id. § 127.580(1).
251 See WIs. STAT. ANN. § 155.20(6) (West Supp. 1991) (statute); id. § 155.30(3)
(form).
252 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.978(4) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1990); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 137-J:2(V)(c) (Supp. 1991). For a comparable general durable
power provision, see S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 59-7-2.8 (Supp. 1992). Pregnancy
limitations are a common feature of living will statutes. See Gelfand, supra note 138,
at 778-79 & nn.169-70 (listing 27 statutes). They may also be unconstitutional. See
Janice MacAvoy-Snitzer, Note, Pregnancy Clauses in Living Will Statuites, 87 COLUM.
L. REV. 1280 (1987).
253 Oregon provides that a later executed power supersedes an earlier executed
living will directive. OR. REV. STAT. § 127.545(4)(a) (1991). Georgia and Illinois
provide instead that the living will is inoperative as long as an agent is available to
deal with life-sustaining or death-delaying procedures. GA. CODE ANN. § 31-36-11
(Michie 1991); ILL ANN. STAT. ch. 110 1/2, para. 804-11 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1992).
Iowa provides that a living will does not restrict the authority of the agent unless the
living will or durable power of attorney for health care expressly provides otherwise.
IOWA CODE ANN. § 144B.6(2) (West Supp. 1992).
24 North Dakota, Texas, Vermont, and West Virginia provide that the
provisions of the document executed later in time control. N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-
06.5-13(2) (1991); TEx. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 135.012 (West Supp.
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the courts resolve this battle of the forms.
6. The Nonconforming Power
There are strong arguments for many of the heightened
requirements found in the statutory form health care power
enactments. Witnessing or acknowledgement may enhance the
document's reliability and the principal's seriousness of purpose.25 s
Detailed rules on witness and agent eligibility may guard against a
perceived risk of undue influence or conflict of interest.25 6 The
requirement that a person clearly express his or her preferences may
reduce the risk of unintentional death.2 7
Even the insistence on mandatory forms may offer a benefit. A
health care provider will know that the form of power enjoys official
legislative backing, thereby reducing the need for an independent
investigation of the power's validity or, perhaps, an inclination to
simply refuse the power.2s8 Yet, these detailed regulatory schemes
may exact a terrible price. The greater the degree of regulation, the
greater is the risk that a principal's power will fail to conform to the
statutory requirements. This problem is most serious for principals
whose previously executed power does not meet the execution and
form requirements of a new home state or a state in which the
principal is present solely to receive treatment. Furthermore,
stationary clients may not read and follow the detailed execution
1992); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 3463(b) (1989); W. VA. CODE § 16-30A-4(d)(8)
(1991). New Hampshire and Wisconsin provide that the provisions of the durable
power control. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 137-J:12(II) (Supp. 1991); WIs. STAT. ANN.
§ 155.70(3) (West Supp. 1992).
2-5 For the witnessing and acknowledgement requirements, see supra notes 139-
42 and accompanying text.
256 For the witness eligibility rules, see supra notes 144-58 and accompanying
text. For the agent eligibility rules, see supra notes 203-09 and accompanying text.
257 For a discussion of those requirements, see supra notes 248-51 and
accompanying text.
258 For a discussion of the mandatory and substantially equivalent form
requirements, see supra notes 160-63 and accompanying text.
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requirements, or, where required, use the right form,25 9 a near
certainty among those who executed powers before the prescribed
form's enactment.
The choice of law rules are the starting point in determining the
validity of a power executed elsewhere. Under the modern approach
to conflicts, the law of the jurisdiction with the most significant
relationship to the principal applies. 260 Under this approach, the
validity of a power is not necessarily governed by the law of the state
in which it was executed. 26' Moreover, given the important public
policy concerns, the law of the state where the power is implemented
probably will control the agent's dealings with health care providers
and other third parties. 262 An obvious solution to the conflict of
259 If this author's experience is representative, defective forms are frequent.
Every client-prepared living will form which this author reviewed while in private
practice was defectively executed. The client either failed to use the prescribed
statutory form or failed to obtain the signatures of the requisite number of witnesses.
26 0 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6(2) (1969). Among
the factors to be considered in determining which relationship is most significant are
the policies of the particular field of law, the protection of justified expectations, and
certainty, predictability, and uniformity of result.
261 Under the traditional territorialist approach to conflicts, the rule that
contract formalities were governed by the state of execution was ironclad. See
RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 334 (1934). The modern approach
backtracks a bit. The formalities of the state of execution are now only usually
accepted. The courts may apply the law of the place of performance if the
formalities are embodied in special regulatory legislation that is designed for the
protection of the parties, an exception that seems to fit statutory form health care
powers. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 199(2) & cmt. c
(1969).
262 There are several routes by which this conclusion may be reached. First,
although the state of execution might control the formalities of execution, the place
of performance will usually control the agent's rights and duties. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS § 291 cmt. f (1969). Second, under both the
traditional and modern approaches to conflicts, the law of the place of performance
will determine the details of performance and the legality of an agent's acts. See
RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 360-361 (1934); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 202, 206 (1969). Finally, the jurisdiction in which the acts
are performed usually will apply its own law if important questions of public policy
are at stake. See RUSSELL J. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF
LAWS 81-85 (3d ed. 1986).
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laws dilemma is to provide a clear statutory rule, at least for
determining the validity of execution. A majority of the statutes,
however, do not address the validity of out-of-state powers.
Nevertheless, several statutes provide that a power is validly executed
if it complies with the requirements of the place of execution, 3 or,
in the alternative, with the law of the principal's residence at the time
of execution. 2
Principals who executed powers before the statutory form was
enacted may also be out of luck. Surprisingly, only slightly over half
of the jurisdictions validate pre-enactment powers.2 16 In contrast,
the District of Columbia explicitly imposes its current execution
requirements and other jurisdictions may have done so through
263 D.C. CODE ANN. § 21-2202(3)(A) (1989); IOWA CODE ANN. § 144B.3(4)
(West Supp. 1992); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 137J:10 (Supp. 1991); N.Y. PUB.
HEALTH LAW § 2990 (McKinney Supp. 1992); N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-06.5-11
(1991); TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 135.013 (West Supp. 1992); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 3461 (1989); W. VA. CODE § 16-30A-17 (1991).
264 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58-630 (Supp. 1991). A better solution is to validate a
power that complies with the law of either the place where executed or the
principal's domicile. Such a dual approach is typical in wills statutes. See, e.g., UNIF.
PROBATE CODE § 2-506, 8 U.L.A. 116 (1983).
265 See CAL. CIV. CODE § 2431(b) & Legislative Comm. cmt. (West Supp. 1992)
(current execution requirements waived); GA. CODE ANN. § 31-36-12 (Michie 1991)
(pre-enactment health care agencies not affected or invalidated); ILL ANN. STAT. ch.
1101/2, para. 804-12 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1992) (same); IOWA CODE ANN. § 144B.2
(West Supp. 1992) (pre-enactment power valid if signed by principal); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 58-631 (Supp. 1991) (pre-enactment powers not limited or otherwise
affected); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.974(2) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1990)
(valid designation of agent may be made in pre-enactment durable power); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 32A-19(e) (1991) (act not to be construed to invalidate pre-enactment
powers); N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-06.5-15 (1991) (chapter does not affect validity or
enforceability of pre-enactment powers); Act effective July 19, 1991, ch. 146, § 3,
1991 N.H. Laws 196, 204 (uncodified) (pre-enactment health care powers not
affected); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2981(5)(e) (McKinney Supp. 1992) (pre-
enactment delegations not invalidated); W. VA. CODE § 16-30A-15(a) (1991) (pre-
enactment powers recognized); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 155.70(4)(a) (West Supp. 1991)
(chapter not to be construed to invalidate pre-enactment powers).
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inaction.266
The diversity among the states calls for creative lawyering. The
attorney should attempt, to the extent feasible, to draft a power of
attorney with the laws of all states in mind. The attorney should
draft a power with specificity, including, most importantly, a
statement of desires as to the withholding or withdrawal of artificial
nutrition and hydration.267 Furthermore, it would be advisable for
principals to reconfirm their powers periodically268 and to prepare
dated memoranda of their thoughts and feelings, 269 particularly
after the onset of a terminal condition.2 70  Finally, the drafter
266 D.C. CODE ANN. § 21-2205(e) (1989). Professor Gelfand, in discussing the
many living will statutes that fail to deal with pre-enactment documents, also con-
cludes that pre-enactment documents must conform to current execution require-
ments. Gelfand, supra note 138, at 782.
267 For a discussion of the current restrictions on the withdrawing or withholding
of artificial nutrition and hydration, see supra notes 247-50 and accompanying text.
268 Periodic reconfirmation will enhance the power's acceptability. Although no
comprehensive "staleness" doctrine for health care powers has evolved, the courts
prefer the recent expressions of desires. See, e.g., John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp.
v. Bludworth, 432 So. 2d 611, 620 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (weight to be accorded
to living will should take into account the "timeliness of its execution"), rev'd on other
grounds, 452 So. 2d 921 (Fla. 1984); In re Westchester County Medical Center ex reL
O'Connor, 531 N.E.2d 607, 613 (N.Y. 1988) ("[Tlhere always exists the possibility
that, despite his or her clear expressions in the past, the patient has since changed
his or her mind."). Furthermore, periodic reconfirmation is a necessity in Oregon.
See supra note 165.
269 Although including a personal statement in the power and arranging for
periodic updating is best, repeated re-execution of the power might be impractical.
A side letter kept with the power may be just as effective. An agent is not only
required to follow the express wishes as stated in the power but also must follow
desires otherwise made known. See supra note 231 and accompanying text. As
might be expected, courts prefer the written expression of desires. "The ideal
situation is one in which the patient's wishes were expressed in some form of a
writing." O'Connor, 531 N.E.2d at 613. Perhaps as a response to O'Connor, New
York has explicitly endorsed the use of written memoranda to supplement a power.
See N.Y. Pun. HEALTH LAW § 2985(I)(d) (McKinney Supp. 1992).
270 To meet the express wishes standard, one must show that the patient "held
a firm and settled commitment to the termination of life supports under the
circumstances like those presented." O'Connor, 531 N.E.2d at 613. Patients who
have met this standard generally have made their statements while terminally
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should identify the most stringent of the execution requirements and
should incorporate them into the powerY'
VI. CONCLUSION
Until about ten years ago, little was written about durable
powers because little could be said. The concept of the durable
power was relatively recent and the statutes in force were simple
affairs that merely authorized the use of the durable power device
without heavily regulating its use. Within the past decade this has
changed. The general durable power statutes are beginning to
fragment, and new varieties of powers, the statutory short-form, the
durable power bank account, and the health care power, have been
enacted in numerous jurisdiction.
All is not chaos, however. Although it has retained its agency
moorings, the durable power is no longer exclusively the creature of
the law of agency. Borrowing from other areas of the law is
common. These borrowed concepts have not been applied indiscrim-
inately to all aspects of durable powers. They have instead been
applied selectively to particular problems at hand. The general
durable power statutes are beginning to borrow heavily from the law
of trusts272 and guardianship. 273 The statutory health care forms
were preceded by the living will statutes. The durable power bank
afflicted. See Couture v. Couture, 549 N.E.2d 571, 576 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989); Leach
v. Akron Medical Center, 426 N.E.2d 809, 811 (Ohio Ct. C.P. 1980). Statements
made without such a clear focus generally have been held insufficient. See Cruzan
v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 411, 424 (Mo. 1988), aff'd sub non. Cruzan v. Director,
Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990); O'Connor, 531 N.E.2d at 614-15; In re
Jobes, 529 A.2d 434, 442-43 (NJ. 1987). But see In re Gardner, 534 A.2d 947, 952-54
(Me. 1987).
271 For a form that attempts to satisfy the execution requirements of all
jurisdictions, see ABA COMM'N ON LEGAL PROBLEMS OF THE ELDERLY, supra note
168.
272 The most notable example is the Durable Power of Attorney Law of
Missouri. For a discussion of this statute, see supra notes 39-50 and accompanying
text.
273 See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
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account is part and parcel of the law on multiple-party bank
accounts.
The statutory short-form does not owe its existence to other
areas of the law. It is a product of a well-intentioned desire to satisfy
a perceived need for readily available forms, 274 a desire that also
contributed to the enactment of the statutory form health care
powers. Unlike the statutory short-form, for which a general durable
power may be substituted, many of the health care forms are a take-
it-or-leave-it proposition. The prescribed forms, ritual execution
requirements, and restrictions on withdrawing or withholding life-
sustaining treatment may be based on well-reasoned considerations
of policy. 275 However, this misplaced desire to protect principals
has made powers more difficult to implement and has discouraged
the use of the very tool that offered the best hope for protection.
274 For a discussion of the asserted benefits of the statutory short-form, see
supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text.
275 For a brief summary of some of these arguments, see supra text accompany-
ing notes 255-58.
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